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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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EGYPT

HAYKAL CRITICIZES DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 22 Feb 86 p 1

[Commentary by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal in column "Frankly Speaking": "Political Decision-Making in Egypt"; second in a projected series of three installments; for the first installment see JPRS NESA 86-038 of 27 March 1986 p 8]

[Text] (2) Political Decision-Making in Egypt. What Impedes The Decision-Making Process.

On the threshold of this second article about the decision-making process in Egypt and without taking leave of reality or engaging in wishful thinking, I would like to say that Egypt, up to this moment, is still in good shape. Its heart is sound and so are its spirit and will.

This statement is borne out by the state of turmoil Egypt is experiencing today in its tireless quest for characterizations and solutions for its problems and ways out of its difficulties, and by all the ongoing discussions and debates on its soil that crowd its atmosphere.

All its people are engrossed with it. They are not satisfied with the whole state of affairs and believe, quite simply, that what they have is less than what they deserve and perhaps far below their real potential.

It may appear at first glance that the proof I have offered is a denial rather than an affirmation, and there is some truth to that. I would like to point out, however, that denial is not always negative and may be positive in some instances.

To give the picture form, let us suppose that our situation is similar to that of any army that does not have tanks with which to move on its target, aircraft to carry it to distant places, or missiles to guide through space.

But this army does have anti-tank guns to stop others from breaking into its lines, anti-aircraft guns to repel aircraft from its skies, and missiles to stop other missiles from entering its horizons.

Let us say that it is an army in a defensive position unable at this hour to push ahead to its objective, but is still capable of defending itself.

Leaving this picture to return to the original issue, we find that, yes, Egypt does have problems. Yes, we are dissatisfied with our overall situation and, yes, we have less than we deserve.

All this is true. But what is also true is that we do not succumb to what surrounds us. We do not allow ourselves to be misled by delusion and we are not ripped apart by fear before its actual causes descend upon us.

We seek and sometimes do not find. We move and sometimes slip. We debate and sometimes go in circles around ourselves and our problems. All this attests to a soundness of heart, spirit, and will.

The important thing is that we are alive and that we hold on to life which we value and appreciate. It is also important that we do not remain silent or hold back and do not allow our eyes to turn into pieces of glass that shine without life because they are mute and expressionless.

Our preoccupation at this moment is the search for a true starting point for a way out of our present situation. Our main concern is one overriding question: "Where do we begin?"

In last week's article, I gave preponderance to the decision-making process as the true starting point and I gave my reasons. The most important of these reasons are:

--Every policy is a decision inasmuch as every decision is a policy. Consequently, decision-making is a precise and sensitive process which, under critical circumstances, requires more precision and stronger sensitivity. What is tolerable under ordinary circumstances becomes intolerable under extraordinary circumstances.

Action in all fields, no matter how diverse--agriculture, industry, education, culture, or other vital goals--is linked to or perhaps stems from a preceding political decision.

--The decision-making process is what regulates the rhythm of dialogue in any country, be it from the standpoint of its seriousness of its mood.

--The decision-making process, when dealing with factual issues, can, unintentionally, sequester the future and restrict the freedom of its choices.

Last week I presented examples of the decision-making process in Egypt which led to the conclusion that "there are specific things obstructing the course of the decision-making process in Egypt and these things certainly have objective reasons. If we can truthfully say that the decision-making process in Egypt today is not a chain of mistakes, we can honestly say at the same time that a high percentage of these decisions requires debate, re-examination, and careful study."

My next question was: "What impedes the decision-making process in Egypt?"

In the interest of fairness, we must submit that a large part of the difficulties impeding the Egyptian decision-making process today has been inherited from yesteryears!

Egypt today is without a "historic plan" to outline the trend and path of decisions at all levels. Therefore, the Egyptian decision-making process is split in many diverse ways that sap its momentum, thus limiting its efficacy.

A historic plan of any country is this country's vision of its greater goal, its perception of its life and the possibilities of its development, and the identification of means and steps necessary to realize all this safeguard its security.

In other words, "the historic plan" of any country is its "historic strategy" on the basis of which all objectives are determined.

It may be appropriate here to give some actual examples.

Let us consider the United States. Its higher strategy is an accurate reflection of its geographical composition following its declaration as a country and its expansion from the east to the west of the continent. Its homeland became an entire continent from ocean to ocean. It considers itself, in its new refuge, to be the heir of the western empires, the fortress of their huge capitalist system and the base of their strength and security. Hence, the scope of its movement extends from its east coast all the way to West Europe (the Atlantic Community) and on the other side from its west coast all the way to Japan, China, or the Asian islands of the Philippines or Indonesia or even Australia!

Within these two parentheses, the Middle East has acquired optimum strategic, economic and human importance. Therefore, the United States must have a hand in it as overlord, if possible, or, failing that, as a moving force.

These are the lines of America's higher strategy that enable us to understand what makes its society tick internally, what is behind its policies externally, and what its specific demands are, starting with the creation of super military alliances by which it is confronting its adversary at this historic stage, namely the Soviet Union, and ending with American political action in our area of the world, be it toward the Arabs or Israel.

We can thus understand as well U.S. tactics, to wit, its daily movements.

As a second example, we can consider India. India is a continent of ethnic groups, sects, religions, and languages. Hence, India's higher strategy is that of unification and assimilation through development and science, while always being ready to defend itself against separatist and secessionist attempts and heedful of China in the east and Pakistan in the west.

Within this whole framework lies India's strategy and daily actions.

As a third example, let us take a quick look at Israel. We see that its higher strategy is continued immigration and uninterrupted expansion, in addition to reliance on a western superpower: Britain at one time, France another time, and the United States always.

This brings us to Egypt:

Egypt used to have a "historic plan" that came into being the minute the [Nile] valley, which is surrounded by the desert, realized that it was part of something larger and, in interest and security, was linked to a greater entity. It is in this greater and larger thing that the surrounded valley finds its identity, interests, and security capabilities.

Historic roots and lessons of a long history notwithstanding, it can be said that the "historic plan" within which Egypt used to move was shaped during the monarchy when its intellectual and cultural hallmarks, molded by poets and writers, musicians and singers, became manifest, until politics, economics, and defense came into play following World War II when these hallmarks and characteristics were transformed into a political framework which is the Arab League.

Thereafter the "historic plan," within which Egypt moved, entered a new post-1952 July stage, that of national revolution.

Then oil came to take the "historic plan" to yet another stage, oil.

Perhaps it is appropriate to re-emphasize at this point that a "historic plan" of any nation is not confined to the political field alone, but extends to all social and military fields and international relations and even to the very modes of operation and language. Whereas the "historic plan" during the monarchy used to express itself through words and gestures, the same plan, in the national revolutionary era, expressed itself in direct action in the street and among the masses. Moreover, this same plan during the oil stage expressed itself through palace contacts where the keys and keepers of the coffers were kept.

Nonetheless, Egypt's movement in the "historic plan" took another turn in the mid-seventies which led it to a separate peace with Israel.

Some people say: "We have employed another option." This matter is not that simple because historic options are too serious to be regarded as a daily pleasure ride. And supposing they were just that, the situation called for preparations and more sweeping changes in all aspects of our life, something that did not happen. Consequently, we neither maintained the rules of the original option nor did we lay down new ones. Hence our action was rendered almost like a train that is derailed and tries to go on any asphalt road or vice versa: a car trying to run on railroad tracks.

Decision-making under such circumstances is rendered difficult or hazardous.

For example, a number of decisions were made in Egypt with the ulterior intention that they may open the doors for Egypt to return to the Arab League. Such a return will not happen despite the sincere determination of many people because there is another practical side to this matter: Arab League political activity concentrates on three points:

--Joint defense (Egypt cannot participate in Arab joint defense plans for they are all directed at Israel. At any rate, this point has been stripped of all meaning with respect not just to Egypt but to everyone else as well for no one knows any more who is with whom and who is against whom all over the Arab world.)

There is also the Arab boycott of Israel (Egypt cannot take part in that under its agreements with Israel) and the resolutions condemning Israeli aggressions (regardless of the value of such resolutions, Egypt cannot take part in them).

Thus, there is nothing that Egypt can do in the Arab League, supposing that it returns to it, save for a seat without a role, a situation unbefitting Egypt and incompatible with its size and historic weight.

Perhaps the most eloquent expression about the Egyptian decision-making predicament in its national and regional environment is the stand toward the Spanish government's recent decision to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel and the ensuing decision of some African countries to follow suit.

An Egyptian decision in this regard seemed difficult. Indeed, an Egyptian position, or even a reasonable formulation of an Egyptian opinion, let alone a position, seemed difficult! Our answer to those who asked for our opinion was the comment that "Egypt does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries!"

It would have been more appropriate for Egyptian diplomacy to make some effort to come up with a more plausible reply. This traditional reply we blurted out was not even neutral, but included, inadvertently, of course, presumed censure of the other Arab countries which tried, diffidently, to point out to Spain and some African countries who had resumed relations with Israel that they regarded these countries' action as an unfriendly act toward them.

The Egyptian decision-making process was in a predicament, no doubt, and I do not think it did itself any favor in trying to work its way out of it by refusing to interfere in the affairs of others! The predicament of the Egyptian decision-making process is most manifest in Egyptian-PLO relations:

The PLO feels, and rightfully so, that historic Egypt is its greatest support but political Egypt is shackled.

Egypt feels that the Palestinian question is vital to its historic security, but its contractual obligations point it in another direction.

Thus, decision-making is rendered almost impossible unless the decision is a rhetorical one or is words without force of deed.

By and large, these are conditions with which the decision-making process today has nothing to do, inherited conditions. Perhaps it is to the advantage of the decision-making process today, and to its credit, that it is able to hear the historic appeal and see the situation as it truly is. It appears as though the decision stays in place and perhaps revolves around itself because it is a struggle between the original historic appeal and the rules of the current situation.

In the days when the "historic plan" (the Arab option plan) was alive, the Egyptian decision-making, right or wrong, was possible because the features were visible.

In the days when the "historic plan," with its social choices, was bubbling, Egyptian decision-making, right or wrong, was possible because the lines were drawn.

Even in the days when the "historic plan" was wrapped in a cloak of oil, Egyptian decision-making, right or wrong, was possible because the centers were defined.

But under these circumstances, Egyptian decision-making (within the framework of the Arab system) walks on unmarked ground and by means for which it is not prepared: a car on a railroad track or a train on a paved road!

The Egyptian decision-making process is faced as well with changes in the Arab world which are equally serious in their long-term effects.

We must admit that the scheme to dominate the Arab world has succeeded somewhat in its old quest to divide the Arab world into geopolitical entities preoccupied with their own affairs.

Its old quest was to divide the Arab world into different areas: the Fertile Crescent area where Baghdad and Damascus would vie for influence; the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf area with Riyadh as its center of influence; the North African area with influence swinging between Algiers and Rabat; and, finally, the Nile Valley area where Egypt would be preoccupied with Sudan and vice versa.

Furthermore, the scheme was not only to engross the new areas in their own affairs, but also to distract them with new struggles within their territory or along their boundaries so that not one of them could emerge as an efficacious force.

Thus, Iraq found itself compelled to enter a war with Iran on the Arab nation's eastern gate; Syria became deeply involved in sectarian confessional and familial reprisals in Lebanon; Saudi Arabia is burdened by the enigmas of South Yemen; Morocco is on a collision course with Algeria over the desert; and Sudan is living through the trials and tribulations of a civil war.

Furthermore, in the absence of an Arab system--a historic plan in which Egypt can participate--the various parties went their own ways. When fate brought

them huge wealth, they squandered it, letting it slip through their fingers like desert sand without leaving any trace.

For 10 years, for instance, Arab income from oil money interests was \$250 million a year on the average.

This is much more than was available to the great empires in history. It is more than the Umayyads had when they established their great dynasty and more than the 'Abbasids had as well. It is more than Great Britain or Spain in their golden eras had. Black gold has come and gone, but the Arabs failed to build an empire, as their Umayyid and 'Abbasid forefathers did, or a super industrial power atop an empire as Great Britain did with the wealth it plundered from its colonies, or to hold on to gold treasures in churches and palaces as Spain did with the gold it stole from the New World, Latin America particularly.

Where has the interest from Arab black gold gone? No one knows for sure, although there exists a set of figures, imposing in their significance, which I saw for the first time in a CIA report and later in a study by professor Nadaf Safran published by Harvard University.

The afore-mentioned set of figures says that the annual Saudi defense budget is equal to the defense budgets of 5 Middle Eastern countries put together: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel!

While these 5 countries together have 60 divisions, 20,000 tanks and 2,000 military aircraft, Saudi Arabia, with a budget equal to theirs, has only 5 divisions, 500 tanks, and 200 aircraft!

The same pattern is repeated in Oman and the figures can be found in a report published in London a few days ago.

The defense budget in the Sultanate of Oman is \$2 billion a year and its army is 25,000 strong while Pakistan's budget is \$200 million less than Oman's and its army is 647,000 strong. Thus, the process facing an Arab world is different from the one Egypt left behind when its decision-makers decided to turn away from the Arab system.

The Egyptian decision-making process is confronted with changes in a wider field: the international sphere with the United States as the most important player, to which Egypt has linked itself through special relations that preceded this process.

Quite simply, the United States of today is different from that to which Egypt linked itself by a special relationship.

On the one hand, its president, Ronald Reagan, has succeeded completely in moving it away, with its consent, from the relative liberalism of Roosevelt, and even Kennedy, to the far right with a quasi-crusader, religious approach that believes that its word is the papal law of the time which others must obey if they do not wish to be excommunicated and expelled from the American paradise on earth!

On the other hand, Ronald Reagan went overboard in his military power delusion, compounding America's domestic and foreign debts and turning the United States into the biggest debtor nation in the world. Confirmed figures show that American debt to the world is unprecedented in history and is primarily represented in American treasury bonds, petrodollars, and other vehicles of direct or indirect borrowing. The amount is astronomical, over \$5 trillion. Moreover, interest on the American domestic debt will reach \$100 billion a year by 1990, on top of this year's balance of payments deficit of \$200 billion. Thus, the United States has been preparing for a cut in its foreign aid programs. As of this year, under the Congressional authorization law, it has begun to cut all spending immediately at a rate of 4 percent, to the point where Israel has been forced to return to the United States close to \$60 million, its share of appropriated aid it had obtained beforehand.

The whole American economic system has changed and is changing every day.

Indeed, the monetary system of the whole world has changed and is on the verge of collapse.

I remember what Michel Joubert, former French minister of foreign affairs and trade, once told me at his office: "They (meaning the U.S.) are pushing us all toward economic ruin, which they believe will get to them after destroying us first, and they find this reassuring. Is this not strange?"

This was before the American president issued his decision to proceed with the Star Wars program at a cost of \$3 trillion, which the world will have to pay, whether it likes it or not, through unfavorable trade terms and a difficult-to-challenge control over the monetary system. Everyone keeps his money reserves in the American monetary vehicle, the dollar, from Saudi Arabia to Japan!

I do not know what the Egyptian decision-makers--who come under daily pressures from the IMF to institute balance and austerity while the IMF is itself unable to say one word to draw attention to the greatest debt and imbalance in the whole world--can do to convince Washington to readopt the kind of logic it forces upon others.

All this renders the decision-making process in Egypt very tempermental for it has to deal with an unrestrained and sometimes irresponsible force. The real dilemma is that Egypt maintains with the United States specially-influenced economic relations through aid and specially-influenced military relations through arms importation. Moreover, these special relations, besides their direct influence, place certain burdens, not to say restrictions, on Egypt's global policy and constitute yet another concern for political decision-makers.

This brings us to the problems facing the political decision-making process in Egypt with regard to Israel. We will note the existence of some familiar practices based on outmoded concepts which I believe were never sound, even in their time.

We convince ourselves sometimes that the conflict between us and Israel is psychological and that peace and tranquility would remove all doubt and melt away all complexes.

We have given tranquility every chance, but it has not been enough to solve the problem of a small piece of land like Taba. Nonetheless, Israel is still pressing on with its occupation in order to impose the terms of relations. Taba is not the only piece of land under occupation for there are 14 other points in the same situation.

The number of locations under occupation is limited, but the significance of their continued occupation is limitless. It is a statement to all interested parties that Israel will not pull back to pre-1967 lines irrespective of any concessions and other signs of tranquility.

The truth is that the Egyptian decision-making process in the Taba question has heretofore been sound on the whole, notwithstanding its occasional rashness. A case in point is the recent Peres proposals for a comprehensive deal with Egypt which we described as positive before receiving the terms of this deal. When we finally read the terms, we discovered that this was not a deal, but rather an outstanding "bill." We were forced to retract our hasty assessment, but the problem is that the world has already accepted Peres' propaganda and believe our instantaneous comments. It believed that Israel was positive, then began having doubts about our retraction, thinking the worst of us while this could not have been the farthest from the truth.

Regarding Israel as well, we convinced ourselves at one point that the ruling group in Israel was comprised of moderates and extremists and that we could play one group against another.

We first used such a tactic during the Kilometer 101 talks while the October War was still going on. General--at the time al-Jamasi--went to his meetings with General Yariv, director of Israeli military intelligence, armed with secret instructions different from the official ones.

The secret instructions told him: "There is a conflict between Prime Minister Golda Me'ir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Yariv is Dayan's man, so exploit this conflict by offering Yariv some concessions to take back to Dayan behind Golda Me'ir's back"!

The same thing happened when we convinced ourselves that Peres was better than Shamir and, therefore, we must seize the opportunity before Peres turned over the Israeli premiership to Shamir in November.

The same thing was repeated with regard to Ezer Weizmann when we had ourselves believing that he was more moderate and sensible than Peres or Shamir and, of course, Sharon.

Thus, between the decision in Egypt and the decision in Israel, Weizmann was turned into a "dove."

And he is still playing the role of a dove up to now.

Such is the influence of concepts established at an earlier time, but still carrying some influence on later times!

I finally come to the problems facing the decision-making process in Egypt and for Egypt.

--The economic facts are painful, their consequences critical, and dealing with them, even with the highest degree of efficiency, is difficult.

--Population growth is impossible to control and 60 percent of the population is under the age of 20.

--Resources used to be barely adequate before the population explosion. At one point, we were able to bridge the widening gap with emergency revenues, such as remittances by Egyptians working abroad, oil exports, and income from the Suez Canal and tourism. All these emergency revenues are falling now.

--Accumulated debts in the seventies, which jumped from \$2 billion in 1971 to \$24 billion in 1981, are now approaching the \$30 billion mark,

I can go on and on.

Decisions-makers at all levels are horrified by what they see. Sometimes they get close, but other times they pull away as though they are facing a highly-explosive mine, which they are.

The social map in Egypt has changed. It changed with the open-door policy, it changed with the age of oil with its money surpluses and Egyptian remittances, and it changed with many other factors as well.

However, the new map has not been drawn or even outlined yet.

The question is: How can the decision-making process operate in a society at variance with itself where the intensity of differences is not known and their influence on its class structure and relations are obscure, although signs of tensions are emerging once again?

Perhaps I am maintaining that we are approaching a dangerous situation because the problems--foremost being inflation, which is reflected in steadily-rising prices--have begun affecting the middle class, which has always been the backbone of the class composition in Egypt.

Hence, we face many pending questions in the domestic decision-making process.

Who exactly makes the decision? And for whose benefit? And what weight does it have in the Egyptian class composition?

Moreover, the political map in Egypt does not represent all social forces. We have noticed in the past that partisan political action has failed to attract more than 4 percent of the electorate, so where are the rest and who represents them in the political arena? How can the decision-making process take into account the huge difference between the social map and the political map? Will the loudest voice have the edge or what exactly are the rules of the political game in the calculations of the decision-making process.

Furthermore, the maps' imbalance between what is changeable, what is undetermined, what is unknown, and what is fluid has allowed the emergence of organized lobbies totally new to Egypt.

Lobbies that wield influence in greater proportion than what they represent-- much greater.

For instance, there is a lobby which represents the so-called businessmen who wield clear influence, but whose actual role in society is less clear.

With respect to the businessmen's lobby, figures reveal what pressures conceal.

Figures say that business sector bank deposits total 700 million Egyptian pounds while their loans amount to 10 billion pounds.

Figures also say that household, non-business deposits total 16 billion Egyptian pounds while their loans amount to 600 million pounds.

This means that the business sector in its operations actually depends on household savings which are being eroded by inflation while businessmen reap the benefits of the real investments.

Accordingly, the pressuring force is the "businessmen" and those pressured are the "savers," actually the middle class.

In addition, there is a disturbing new phenomenon which is the growing relationship between some ruling elements and some business groups. There has been a back-and-forth movement between these two sides: businessmen going directly into government and government officials going into business. I do not wish to mention names because the intention here is to talk about the phenomenon rather than to point a finger at anyone in particular.

Besides the businessmen's lobby, there are other lobbies as well:

There is a lobby for closer relations with the United States--interest [groups].

More unusual is the lobby for closer relations with Israel. I do not believe these are relations of interests. Perhaps this is a misunderstanding or miscalculation!

The political decision-making process feels the pressures and sometimes resists them. But the voices are loud and resounding!

I pause before another problem facing the political decision-making process: real men. The process ultimately needs true men in leading positions, but the majority of them has been consumed.

Some have been consumed by emigration or jobs abroad due to a number of reasons.

Some have been consumed by the open-door policy which prompted them to leave fields of real work for other, easier fields in search of quick wealth.

Some have been consumed by negligence which has left them nothing but memories inside and dust and rust on the surface. This is a waste of human resources and valuable experiences but, nonetheless, it is a fact.

Some have been consumed by corruption for temptation is exciting and virtue is boring in an age when values are disappearing at the same rate as stock and financial markets go up and down.

Finally, some have been consumed by overuse.

Some quarters actually resemble used car lots where no one is quite sure what shape these cars are in, on what kind of roads they have traveled, or whether the mileage on the odometer is true or has been altered.

Thus, we find that the decision-making process is in need of real men in leading positions.

But the well-known among them have been consumed and most of the new ones are not known and, therefore, betting on them is a risky but definitely necessary game. This is because the nature of things calls for new men from a generation which, by right and necessity, must bear the responsibility of its age.

We might add that the apparatus in charge of implementation, namely the government, has also been consumed just as much as or more than the men.

It has been worn out by time, experience, and conflicting laws. It has become accustomed to ignoring policies and bowing to the authorities.

Moreover, its lobbies have been sought by corrupt elements, including the impossibility of reconciling an inflated cost of living with a suppressed pay schedule. All this is at a time when the atmosphere is full of eye-dazzling and mind-boggling temptations.

One last point worth mentioning in this regard is that everyone works without the benefit of archives or, more accurately, recollection.

We have gotten rid of all our past experiences. Our modern history is divided into three epochs: one we have neglected, one we have attacked, and one we want to forget.

Hence the decision-making process in Egypt appears to be carrying out its responsibilities within the framework of reaction because fundamentals are lacking.

Past experiences may and indeed do have aspects that may rightly be ignored, criticized or forgotten. But they have much more than that. They include fundamentals that have grown and branched out. The strange thing is that Egypt, the country of history, forgets its history while others seek to borrow it.

For example, the document on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel pointed out that "relations between the two peoples are being restored following a 500-year rift!" This, of course, was an allusion to the Jewish exodus from Spain during the Inquisition. In other words, the "state" of Israel borrowed a history it did not possess and went overboard in "authenticating" matters to the point of "inventing" them.

By way of another example, Czarist Russia's archives have and still represent the Soviet Union's recollection with regard to pre-revolution issues and relations, although changes brought about by the revolution were radical and decisive.

All countries of the world have a recollection that links its present to its roots and gives the future an awareness of the historic dimension of its steps.

In the absence of a historic discussion, the political decision-making process in Egypt seems at times to be swimming on a rocky beach on a stormy day!

(We might add to this aspect the aspect of information and how it is received and circulated at all decision-making levels. This point deserves a separate study, at any rate.)

And now, what can decision-makers do in the face of this and how are they supposed to act?

We may venture at first and focus our answer on what must not be done or, in other words, what must be avoided at this time.

At this time, for instance, decision-makers have no right to despair and bring back the old adage: "It's no use!", or to recall the Shakespearean cry in his great epic about Julius Caesar, as uttered by Mark Antony when he said: "O Romans, if any of you have tears left, shed them now!"

It is still too early for such an adage.

At this time, for example, it does not befit decision-makers to invoke old answers to new questions in the way that brings to mind the story of Winston Churchill, who became prime minister of Great Britain in 1940 at the most critical point of the last world war when France, Britain's strong ally, was on the verge of surrender. Churchill was sitting with the British Empire's chiefs-of-staff listening to their plans for conducting the war. He listened

and listened some more, then fell into a deep silence, while all eyes were on him, and seemed to be in a daze. When he came out of his daze, the first thing he said was:

"Gentlemen, you are planning for the last war!"

If we forego the negative method in favor of the positive, we find that it may be appropriate for decision-makers in Egypt today, under current circumstances, and so long as we are quoting famous proverbs, to remember what Machiavelli, the professor of modern political science, said in his book, "The Art of War":

"Scrupulous organization adds to man's intrepidity while anarchy spreads fear in the most courageous hearts."

"Few are those who are courageous by nature, but scrupulous organization, coupled with lessons learned from experience, gives the general public a much greater chance for certain victory than courage!"

I said at the beginning of this article that Egypt is still in good shape. I repeat the same thing at the end of the article, but the nagging notion that forces itself upon the last line is:

"But for how long?"

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CSO: 4504/228

EGYPT

RA'S BURQAH KILLER EULOGIZED

Islamic Center Planned

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Feb 86 p 1

[Text] Struggler Ibrahim Shukri, in Ikyad to participate with the people of the village in the 40th day observance of the martyrdom of Sulayman Khatir, announced that contributions will be accepted from the public for the construction of a major Islamic center to be named after the martyr Sulayman Khatir. The center will have a mosque, a school, a religious institute, and an educational library in order that it may light the way for youths generations to come and complement the example set by the martyr for morality, righteousness, and diligence in duty.

Attempts by security forces to keep Ibrahim Shukri from entering Ikyad on Monday, 17 February, almost caused them to clash with Abd-al-Mun'im Khatir, the martyr's brother. Groups of village youths waited for the Labor Party leader's motorcade at village limits and near Labor Party headquarters in Faqus. When he arrived they put him in a different car and headed for the martyr's home avoiding the roads blocked by Central Security Forces. Surrounded by the martyr's family and a group of party youths who came from Cairo bearing flowers, struggler Ibrahim Shukri walked to the martyr's grave where they all stood reverently to read suras from the Qur'an.

Afterwards, a large conference was held in front of the martyr's house. It got underway when the martyr's brothers, 'Abd-al-Hamid and Abd-al Mun'im Khatir, acting on behalf of the family and of the people of Akyad, presented struggler Ibrahim Shukri with God's Book in appreciation for his stand on the issue and as a practical response to false allegations that the villagers had refused to receive him. Abd-al-Mun'im Khatir stated that the 40th day observance would not have taken place without the presence of Ibrahim Shukri and that he had notified the police that the observance would be postponed until the leader came to Ikyad.

Ikyad surrounded Ibrahim Shukri's motorcade in a huge march that lasted longer than an hour. They denounced the position of the ruling party and asserted that Sulayman was a victim of homicide, not suicide.

Mother Invokes God's Vengeance

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Feb 86 p 2

[Article by 'Imad Mahjub]

[Text] Addressing thousands of villagers who gathered in front of the martyr's house, Ibrahim Shukri said: I wish I had met him. Perhaps he wished it also. I saw him when his blessed remains were on the table. His handsome face shone with faith. I put my hand in his and kissed his forehead. It was an encounter I'll never forget.. The brothers were inspecting the blessed body and the marks on it, but my heart told me that that youngster could not have committed suicide. My heart didn't lie and neither does the evidence. Sulayman did not take his own life. He was killed. They have done him injustice in life and again in death.

There are those who attack me, claiming I am using the Sulayman Khatir issue to fabricate a cause celebre. To them I say that Sulayman Khatir will forever be a martyred hero. This youngster will remain an example of sincerity and faith in the performance of duty.

He was an example of the soldier always at the ready with his weapon in his hand and also prepared to do his duty.

The Zionists had demanded his head prior to the Taba talks because they feared that this spirit (the spirit of doing one's duty and defending the land) might permeate the nation. Does it then make sense that he takes his own life when he had two Qur'ans in his room? When the day before the incident he was surrounded by his family in a visit filled with hope and aspiration that he would pursue his degree and practice law?

It saddens me deeply that I was unable to be here for the martyr's funeral. The police prevented us from what we wished to do as if my coming to Ikyad would cause all kinds of calamities. In reality, they feared the solidarity of the masses with sincere leadership.

We Did Not Come To Offer Condolences

Ahmad Mujahid, Labor Party member of the People's Assembly, said: I don't see myself as participating in a wake because we are here to strengthen our will and reaffirm our dedication to continue the quest. By doing what he did, this sharp-eyed, slim youngster has resurrected from the dead our entire Arab nation. From my travels in the Arab lands I bring you the esteem for the village that bestowed its martyred son as a garland for the Arab nation. The whole Arab nation looks at Ikyad as a vanguard of struggle.

Faith and Work

Majdi Ahmad Husayn, secretary general of the Youth Alliance, said: Talk is difficult now that Sulayman has translated his beliefs into a lasting action that will forever endure because it has kindled in this generation the spirit of struggle that they have attempted to suffocate.

This spirit has also touched the Egyptian army. A number of officers have clashed with the Israelis in Taba and the Egyptian navy sank an Israeli spy vessel carrying modern, sophisticated equipment.

We, as youths, should heed the example of Sulayman Khatir because Egypt needs deeds. Even simple deeds are ultimately greater than thousands of words and the ultimate greatness is to die for one's country, setting for others an example of sacrifice.

Usamah Sulayman, secretary general of the Labor Youth Alliance in al-Sharqiyah Governorate, said that Sulayman did not die as have the despots of all eras God, who misses nothing in the two worlds, is quick to mete out justice and He will not forget to avenge Sulayman.

The People Will Be Victorious

Colleague Ibrahim 'Ibadah, secretary of the Labor Party in the Hihya district, said, "The hero has joined the honor roll. They accused him of being mad, so how would one describe those who sell out their homeland and then speak into their microphones in the People's Assembly, 'Mercy on the youngsters who were misled in Ikyad and within the sacred al-Azhar mosque.' The truth is that they are the ones who deceive but the people will recognize their deception and will pay them back."

Hamdi al-Sayyid Mutawalli, speaking for the youths of Ikyad, welcomed Ibrahim Shukri and then said that Radwan and his party are deceivers and should be the last to discuss Egyptian youths in general and Ikyad youths in particular. He concluded by asserting that all of Egypt is Sulayman Khatir.

Eng Abd-al-'Aziz Nassar, member of the Socialist Labor Party in Cairo, recited a collection of poems in salute to the martyred hero.

The conference was moderated by Mr Husayn 'Azzazi, a native of Ikyad and a friend of the martyr. He elaborated on the issues raised and applauded the positions of the Labor Party and its leaders and of AL-SHA'B newspaper and its editors.

After the conference, Ibrahim Shukri shook hands with the martyr's brothers, mother, and other family members. The mother said: Sulayman is your son and brother and you are his family. There is a God and His justice will avenge my son.

12945/12790
CSO: 4504/227

MOROCCO

COMMENTARY OPPOSES CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN ELECTIONS

Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 10 Mar 86 p 1

[Commentary by Abdelkrim Ghallab: "With the People"]

[Text] Our citizens abroad make their presence felt in the homeland, not by their problems with residence and work or with unemployment and deportation and by their work when they return to the homeland, but they have come to the point of making their presence felt as citizens who have their national base, be they on foreign soil or in the homeland. This is what the connection of the homeland with them and their connection with the homeland confirms.

His Majesty the King expressed the idea of these citizens' pride in their country in his press conference as he was responding to a question connected with the right to vote in municipal councils, which the Netherlands granted to foreigners, among whom are Moroccans. His Majesty stated: "I oppose Moroccan citizens participating in elections which take place in foreign states. I believe that hospitality, cooperation and joint action do not mean assimilation. The assimilation of the Moroccan citizen is difficult. Moroccan inherited qualities are matters which must be taken into consideration. Why do you want the Moroccan to salute, ostensibly or inwardly, as he is listening to the Dutch national anthem? And after 30 or 60 years, why is he required to go to the battlefield to defend France or Germany as a Frenchman or a German?"

This is the patriotic consideration which His Majesty stressed to emigre citizens. If we are grateful to some foreign states for giving foreigners the right to practice some sovereignty in their countries by way of, for instance, municipal elections, then Moroccan citizens abroad must be committed to practicing this right of theirs in their country since they are able to fulfill it, either at the local level, if they are present in the homeland, or at the national level to elect their representatives in the Chamber of Representatives, even if they are outside of the country.

Emigrating for work should not deprive the citizen of his citizenship. Along with thanking governments that give citizens this right it is incumbent on citizens to excuse themselves for nonparticipation in elections in foreign countries in deference to the homeland and to the patriotic concept which His Majesty the King expressed.

/9365
CSO: 4504/255

BAHRAIN

BUDGET FOR 1986, 1987 DISCUSSED

Manama AL-BAHRAYN in Arabic 29 Jan 86 pp 22-25

[Text] His Excellency Mr Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim, minister of finance and national economy, delivered a statement on radio and television in which he spoke about the state's public budget for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987.

His excellency opened his statement by saying: By the grace of God Almighty the decree determining the state's budget for the fiscal years 1986-1987 has been approved by his highness the deputy to his exalted highness the prince, Shaykh Hamd Ibn 'Isa Al Khalifah.

To begin with, I would like to point out that this budget reflects the lofty directives that we in the Ministry of Finance and National Economy received during the preparation of this budget from his highness the exalted prince, his highness the respected prime minister, may God Keep him in health, and his highness the crown prince, since their directives had the greatest effect on our carrying out our task in a way that pleases God and realizes the hopes and expectations of our fellow citizens.

The nature of this budget is that of any other budget. It is a reflection of the government's directives and of its fiscal policy, and as such it is a tool for implementing that policy. On this basis, many things were taken into consideration according to the direct or indirect effect they would have on the performance level in the government system on the one hand, and on the growth and prosperity of the national economy on the other. Some of these considerations were:

1. That this budget is a part of the fiscal plan for government revenues and expenditures for the period from 1986 to 1991 and it includes concepts of the future based on indicators of the world economic situation and how they reflect on the Arab Gulf region in general and on Bahrain in particular, by virtue of it being a center for trade, finance, and services.
2. The difficult and unsettled conditions that the world oil market is going through, the fluctuations in oil prices, and the effect of that on the country's resources because of the importance that oil revenues have among the components of the budget's elements.

3. Continuation of the implementation of projects of the current development program, and preparation of the next development program, which, God willing, will begin as of 1988, with the arrangement of projects along the scale of priorities under review.

4. The effect of government spending on the level of local economic activity, since government spending is of major importance in spurring economic activity and realizing a reasonable level of growth in the national income.

5. The resolutions that were issued by the cabinet concerning the rationalization of spending, an end to waste and duplication, and the utilization of available resources in sound ways without affecting the level of services offered to the people or the development of basic facilities, as well as the various edicts and financial systems that this ministry issued in carrying out and in support of the decisions regarding policies on rationalizing spending.

The total state budget for 1986-1987 is 1.11 billion Bahraini dinars, of which 550 million dinars is for 1986 and 560 million dinars is for 1987. This budget exceeds actual spending for 1984 and 1985 by 67 million dinars, or 6 percent.

With respect to income, the portion of oil revenues in this budget will be 681 million dinars, or 61 percent of the budget's total income. Even though this percentage seems encouraging because it represents a drop in the budget's dependence on oil sector revenues, the components of budget revenues from local sources include the issuing of development bonds and treasury notes in the amount of 47 million dinars during 1986-1987 and I should mention that in the event of a sharp drop in oil prices, a budget deficit is possible, so we have been cautious when estimating revenues because of the unsettled conditions in the oil industry, which I have mentioned before, along with the direct effect they have on revenues, and the indirect effect on the levels of economic activity which reflect on other revenues.

As for expenditures, recurring expenditures will be 721 million dinars, or 65 percent of government spending for the 2 years, while developmental expenditures will be 389 million dinars, or 35 percent of that spending. Going back to the recurring budget, we see that salaries and wages in it are 425 million dinars, or 59 percent of the recurring budget, while the remaining percentage is distributed among other categories, which are expenditures for services, consumer goods, capital goods, maintenance, conversion payments, and aid and loan repayments. In this respect I should mention that the budget for the Ministry of Education, including higher education, will be 127 million dinars, and that the budget for the Ministry of Health will be 69 million dinars, so the education and health sectors still enjoy first place in this budget.

With respect to the developmental expenditures, their allotments for 1986 and 1987 are 389 million dinars, of which 188 million dinars are earmarked for electricity, water, sewers and roads, while 74 million dinars are earmarked for housing. Fifty-one million dinars have been earmarked for facilities pertaining to education, health, social affairs, information, youth and sports, and the municipalities. As for infrastructure such as the airport, the port, industry, agriculture, and communication, their allotments are 46 million dinars. In this respect we should explain that works that are now in

progress will be 98 million dinars, while allotments for new projects on which work will begin during the next 2 years will be 290 million dinars.

As long as we are analyzing figures and the tendencies that they reflect, we should point to two important facts:

First: The level of income expected during the upcoming period might not be able to meet the growing needs of government spending, so we are in the process of re-analyzing the costs of each sector and the social and economic returns of each. If we were to take, for example, the essential facilities, which are the airport, the port, roads, electricity, water sewers, and housing, we would see that their over-all costs, including operational costs, during 1986 and 1987 would be around 409 million dinars, while their returns in state revenues for the same period would not be more than 113 million dinars.

Second: By virtue of the fact that direct government spending is the essential spur to economic activity, it must be accompanied by an increase in investment in all producing sectors, whether the private sector, the mixed sector, or public establishments if one wants the national income to grow at reasonable rates. Therefore, the report by the committee of strategic options, which this ministry will present shortly to the cabinet, will study in detail how to reach the defined goals of growth, along with the changes in some policies and pursued methods that all that demands.

We humbly ask God that this attempt by us to prepare and execute this budget will be a step along the road leading to an advanced standard of living for our fellow citizens and the growth of our national economy, and carry it in rapid steps to achieve the goals that this government wishes to achieve in all areas, asking help of God and supported by the efforts of every individual in this society, and proceeding along the road of happiness and stability under the leadership of his highness the exalted prince of the country, may God preserve and protect him.

Summary of the estimated amounts in the state budget for projects of the fiscal years 1986-1987 in thousands of dinars.

Number	Ministry	1986	1987
1	Defense	9,040	5,015
2	Interior	3,923	2,097
3	Cabinet Affairs	36	157
4	Foreign	4,992	728
5	Justice and Islamic Affairs	1,496	1,888
6	Information	8,885	3,355
7	Education	5,220	7,488
8	Academic College/Gulf College	1,900	4,200
9	Health	2,834	9,697
10	Labor and Social Affairs	1,744	537
11	Public Establishment for Youth and Sports	2,076	925
12	Commerce and Agriculture	5,300	6,800
13	Development and Industry	1,853	2,820
14	Civil Aviation Administration	6,244	7,630
15	Finance and National Economy*	8,036	7,106
16	Housing	38,700	34,800
17	Public Work Affairs	32,270	47,164
18	Electricity	55,912	52,201
19	Communications	936	333
20	Central Municipality Agency	1,603	1,059

*Includes amounts placed under the control of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy but essentially earmarked for compensating some of the ministries.

Table showing the amounts for income categories for the period from 1985-1987 in thousands of dinars.

Category	1985	1986	1987
Oil Sectors Revenues	375,000	335,000	346,000
Taxes on International Trade	33,000	33,000	33,000
Goods and Services	15,000	15,100	16,200
Administrative Fees	9,000	8,900	9,000
Income from Government Services	55,000	60,000	63,200
Income from Property and Investment	6,000	29,600	29,600
Aid and Loans	48,000	68,200	62,800
Bids and Auctions	1,000	200	200
Total	542,000	550,000	560,000

Table showing amounts for fixed expenditures for the period from 1985-1987 in thousands of dinars

Category	1985	1986	1987
Fixed Expenditures	348,000	357,000	364,000
1. Labor Force Expenses	200,350	210,699	217,367
2. Services Expenses	34,022	34,917	35,566
3. Consumer Goods	31,200	30,190	31,513
4. Capital Goods Expenses	10,170	11,043	11,183
5. Maintenance Expenses	15,293	17,893	17,945
6. Conversion Expenses	46,908	27,280	25,448
7. Aid and Loan Repayments	10,057	24,978	24,978
8. Created Expenditures	194,000	193,000	196,000
Over-all Total	542,000	550,000	560,000

Table showing the increase or decrease in repeated expenditures of the ministries during 1984-1986 in thousands of dinars.

Number	Ministry or Other Government Office	1984	1985	%	1986	%	1987	%
1	Office of His Highness the Prime Minister	232	224	(3)	273	22	277	1
2	Defense	49,724	49,282	(1)	50,741	3	51,567	2
3	Interior	47,767	47,962	-	47,885	-	47,885	-
4	State for Cabinet Affairs	4,240	4,175	(2)	4,314	3	4,183	(3)
5	State for Legal Affairs	284	280	(1)	369	32	373	1
6	Foreign	4,544	4,436	(2)	4,496	1	4,496	-
7	Justice and Islamic Affairs	2,819	2,790	(1)	2,924	5	3,052	4
8	Information	12,322	12,000	(3)	11,711	(2)	11,459	(2)
9	Education	45,978	47,848	4	53,589	12	57,731	8
10	Health	33,155	33,261	-	33,928	2	35,178	4
11	Labor and Social Affairs	5,526	5,761	4	5,650	(2)	5,548	(2)
12	Public Establishment for Youth and Sports	4,463	4,343	(3)	4,289	(1)	4,244	(1)
13	Commerce and Agriculture	4,817	4,601	(4)	4,884	6	4,766	(2)
14	Development and Industry	8,508	8,072	(5)	8,175	1	7,986	(2)
15	Finance and National Economy	15,885	15,926	-	16,339	3	15,848	(3)
16	Housing	4,163	4,120	(1)	3,953	(4)	3,776	(4)
17	Public Works, Electricity and Water Communication	42,486	43,759	3	46,014	5	50,224	9
18	Miscellaneous Budgets	6,906	6,926	-	6,661	(4)	6,427	(4)
19	Conversion Payments	3,647	3,680	1	3,714	1	3,721	-
20	Total Recurring Expenditures	343,168	348,000	1	357,000	3	364,000	2

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CSO: 4404/241

ISRAEL

EVOLUTION OF "WHO IS A JEW" BILL REVIEWED

Tel Aviv SPECTRUM in English No 3 Mar 86 pp 19, 20

[Text]

In February the Knesset voted by 61-47 to defeat the "Who is a Jew?" amendment to the Law of Return; the motion was tabled by the coalition of Orthodox political parties in the Knesset. Simply referred to as Who-is-a-Jew, this indeterminable existential quest has become the occasion for an annual coalition crisis.

The Orthodox parties want to tighten up what they consider the vagueness of the language of the Law of Return - a law which guarantees Jews the right to immigrate to Israel and receive immediate citizenship - because they oppose conversions to Judaism performed by non-Orthodox rabbis.

Because of Labour's philosophical commitment to Jewish pluralism, and to its concrete relationships with the Conservative and Reform movements in American Jewry, Who-is-a-Jew marks the border of the Alignment's willingness to compromise with the religious parties. (Labour has been trying, apparently with modest success, to pry the religious parties away from their cozy relationship with Likud; they represent the balance of power in the Knesset, given the current constellation of forces, and their support would be crucial to a political strategy based on early elections or a narrow sans Likud — coalition.

The specific issue involves Israeli recognition of converts to Judaism who underwent either Reform or Conservative conversions abroad. This recognition affects their treatment by the government if they immigrate to Israel. The defeated amendment sought to ensure that anyone converted in a non-Orthodox ceremony who then moves to Israel would not be recognized as a Jew, and therefore could not receive citizenship on the basis of the Law of Return.

In point of fact, the numbers of convert immigrants is small enough to warrant a quieter method of reaching an understanding; various compromise proposals have been mooted, including the establishment of a "conversions court" comprised of rabbis from the three streams in the United States. Sources in some Orthodox circles favour one or another compromise formula. Yet the number of religious parties works against moderation: held captive by the most extreme elements, against which they will have to compete in the next elections, even the moderates must demonstrate their commitment to the amendment.

The Labour Party provided the backbone of opposition to the bill by imposing faction discipline on its parliamentary party. (The one Labour Knesset member, Rabbi Menachem Hacohen, who was allowed to vote for the bill was a reluctant supporter, and told *The Jerusalem Post* that "the law is completely superfluous and should never have been tabled". Labour Party Secretary-General MK Uzi Bar'am described the matter as "a basic issue of principle".

Although Labour's unequivocal position hardly pleased the much-wooed religious MKs, most of their anger was directed at Likud: the right-wing party failed to deliver on its promise to secure 38 of its 41 representatives to vote for the law. (Three voted against, one abstained, and eight stayed away from the Knesset, voting with their feet.)

In a speech two days later Prime Minister Shimon Peres said the question was not "Who is a Jew?" but "Who is a rabbi?". In replying to the Knesset debate, Peres said that Israelis must make "an effort to maintain a common life" rather than "aggravate those

[religious] definitions and risk tearing the nation to pieces".

Peres also sought to emphasize the different provinces of authority, recently blurred in debates over the Temple Mount (see editorial) and other sensitive issues. "There is a Knesset. There is a rabbinate. The Knesset must decide in national and political matters. The rabbinate may issue religious rulings. The Knesset must not decide on the *Halakha* (religious law), and the Knesset must not cast off its responsibility for the coexistence

of our people." The last nail was driven in several days after the defeat of the law by Rabbi Eliezer Schach, a powerful and influential Orthodox leader whose word is accepted as definitive by five MKs from two different parties. In a wide-ranging interview in which he also stated support for "relinquishing territories in exchange for peace" and denounced attempts by other Orthodox figures to introduce Jewish worship on the Temple Mount, Schach dismissed Who-is-a-Jew as an irrelevancy.

/12851
CSO: 4400 /150

ISRAEL

TEXTBOOKS DISCRIMINATE AGAINST SEPHARDIM

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by Joel Rebibo]

[Text] Sephardi Jews are depicted in school text books as being dirty, boorish, diseased, uneducated, superstitious and primitive, Dr. Ruth Firer told the Knesset Education Committee yesterday.

"There is no doubt that this stereotyping has caused deep emotional damage," said Firer, a high-school history teacher, who surveyed text books as part of her PhD thesis. "Today's teachers were reared on these images of Oriental Jews."

The Knesset committee was also presented with a page from a high-school phonetics text which notes that the letter *ayin* is pronounced one way by Oriental Jews, but "in our days like an *aleph*.

"The implicit message is that the Sephardi pronunciation is obsolete," said Sam Ben-Shitrit, of the Am Ehad-Be'yahad movement. "This is a call to Sephardim to abandon their special pronunciation and

become modern."

Ben-Shitrit challenged a 1966 history book that claimed that there were no Jewish youth movements in Morocco.

Though history books published after 1977 no longer describe Oriental Jews in derogatory terms, Firer pointed out that the old books are still widely used, "at times surreptitiously."

Firer said that the contribution of Oriental Jews to the founding of the state has been "isolated" from that of other Jews in the new text books, and that the history and culture of Oriental Jews throughout history are not taught to most pupils.

The Education Ministry's curriculum head, Shlomo Eliyahu, said that the ministry is willing to support any effort to write new texts. He added, however, that an integrated history of the Jewish people would run the risk of "obliterating the special nature of each group."

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CSO: 4400/150

ISRAEL

LEGAL CURBS ON MEDIA PROPOSED

Tel Aviv SPECTRUM in English No 3 Mar 86 pp 16, 17

[Article by Bradley Burston]

[Text] The free Israeli press is under attack. That's not news. What is new is the confusion and conflict at the busy intersection of the first and fourth estates.

The latitude allowed the Israeli journalist and the freedom enjoyed by the press are the envy of many a foreign correspondent resident in Israel. Recently, however, with the disclosure of police investigations into the activities of high-ranking politicians, voices have been raised in favour of instituting government-monitored controls on the press.

First to propose legal curbs on the press was Liberal Party (Likud) Justice Minister Moshe Nissim. The bill drafted by Nissim would, in effect, ban the publication of the names of suspects in criminal cases until after the issue of a formal indictment. "There has been an abundance of leaks from police investigations", Nissim told reporters, "and this is not only wrong, but against the law, and prohibited by police order". Nissim was asked why he had chosen the press as the target of his legislation and not the police sources responsible for leaking information. "I don't blame the newspapers for printing what is supplied to them", he replied, "but the good name of the individual has to be of paramount importance. The press has, in the past, tarnished reputations, sometimes with banner headlines, and when the suspect was later cleared of suspicion, the media did little to return to the individual his lost honour. In point of fact, it was the actions of the press that gave rise to this legislation, and the inability of the Israel Press Council to enforce its code of ethics on the nation's newspapers." (The Israel Press Council was

established in 1963 by the journalistic community to impose ethical constraints upon itself.)

The response of the press, and of the Press Council, was not long in coming. Wrote Hanna Zemer, editor of *Davar*, "The level of voluntary restraint on the part of the Israeli press is unparalleled among democratic countries. The general public does not know this because, after all, there are matters that go unreported. But high-ranking officials who approach the Press Council just about every other day — and whose personal requests for discretion are granted — know this very well."

During a recent meeting with Nissim, Prime Minister Shimon Peres, press representatives and Yehoshua Rotenstreich — a founder and currently president of the Press Council — countered the justice minister's arguments with a lengthy list of examples of media self-regulation and restraint. Included were the cases of the massive airlift of Ethiopian Jewry — a secret kept by the press but spilled to the world by attention-starved Jewish Agency officials — and of numerous journalists who, unknown to Nissim, have been severely disciplined for infringements of the Press Council code of ethics. Momentarily nonplussed, Nissim was subsequently buoyed by fellow Likud ministers and once more pressed the attack.

As Nissim's bill began the tortuous route to the Knesset floor, journalists voiced fears that banning the publication of the names of

suspects was only the opening round in an ongoing struggle to control the press. Their concern was intensified by the announcement of proposals that would require reporters to divulge sources on demand and to be licensed by the government. These proposals were swiftly quashed, however, by stiff and efficient opposition from an unexpected source - the office of the minister of justice.

"I utterly reject these proposals, and have taken steps to eliminate any possibility of their passage", Nissim announced. "I see in these bills a real threat to freedom of the press, the cornerstone of our democracy. If a reporter is required to reveal his sources of information, he is deprived of the possibility of bringing forth facts of vital importance to the public. If a journalist is to be required to take out a license in order to write, this constitutes a serious blow to freedom of expression."

While politicians and editors wrangle over control of the print media, the protracted battle for authority over Israel's only television station is waged in storerooms, board rooms and back rooms, well offscreen. Regularly and without explanation, the nightly news is interrupted by political power plays involving technicians, directors, reporters, anchormen and a rich profusion of warring union committees and management tiers. For periods ranging from several minutes to several days a curious public is left firmly, and literally, in the dark.

"It's unbelievable," Israel Broadcasting Authority Director Uri Porat has remarked. "We have such a miserable car, but everyone in Israel is trying to get into the driver's seat." Porat was appointed to his post by former Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, whom he had served as press spokesman. The Likud, furious with "left bias" in television coverage of events in the occupied territories and unsympathetic accounts of the Lebanon war, hoped that Porat would effect a political turnaround in television news. Porat's sponsors were soon disappointed.

In January 1985, Porat selected Haim Yavin, a popular anchorman and host of Israel's respected though low-budget weekly news documentary programme to head Israel TV. Porat immediately found himself at loggerheads with the slim Likud majority on the Israel Broadcasting Authority board. "They charged that Yavin is a leftist", Porat

said at the time, "and that I am a traitor because I rejected their choice. I told them I was not a Soviet commissar who would do the party's bidding, right or wrong: I picked Yavin because he was the best man for the job." At length Yavin was rejected, and for the better part of a year Israel Television was left without a director.

Dr. Israel Peleg, director of the Government Press Office and a member of the Broadcasting Authority board, argues that irresolute management practices increase the vulnerability of the government-owned TV station to partisan pressures. Though board members are chosen on the basis of talent and experience appropriate to their position as technical and creative advisors to television management, they also serve as representatives of the parties that nominate them. In Peleg's view, the latter role all too often takes precedence over the former.

"The day-to-day interference of board members takes many forms. Among the gravest examples were the exceptionally aggressive attempts by David Admon, an associate of (Likud-Liberals) Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai, to influence the hiring of 'sympathetic' news reporters and editors. There are also hidden, one-on-one contacts between board members and production personnel of news and interview shows. These are absolutely contrary to station regulations but it would be naive to conclude that all board members abide by the regulations - especially during elections."

The influence of politics on television programming has aroused in print journalists both an appreciation of the newspapers' relative independence and growing concern regarding current attempts to curtail press freedoms. Print media controls will not come easily, however, nor sit well with a press corps unaccustomed to political bridling (even decisions of the chief military censor are subject to appeal and reversal). Warns Hanna Zemer, should government restrictions be placed on journalistic freedom, the first to suffer may well be politicians who favour the curbs. "You can't have it both ways. From now on, when a minister has an urgent request to the press to refrain from publishing, he will be referred to Nissim, the initiator of the law. This is now his field of expertise, it is his method, and he will bear the responsibility for it."

The Israeli is nothing if not a creature of habit. The list of national addictions is imposing, a palette of preoccupations daubed with the likes of acrid cigarettes, sunflower seeds, football lottery tickets and bizarre investment schemes. No habit is more pervasive, however, no addiction more compelling, than the urge indulged, in advanced cases, at least once each waking hour - the Israeli's insatiable passion for news.

Throughout the nation on stifling buses thousands upon thousands of passengers, disparate in national origin, class, mode of dress and educational background, simultaneously lower their gaze to their watches in pace with the electronic beeping that precedes the radio news. (There are four long daily radio news magazines in addition to the hourly broadcasts.) In small settlements as well as in metropolitan centres the arrival of the afternoon newspaper editions is an event of no small import. Every night the apartment complexes lining city streets turn into gigantic relay speakers for the broadcast of the nightly television news; rare is the family for whom the rainbow logo of the nine o'clock broadcast is not a fixture of the evening ritual. Prime Minister Shimon Peres actually recommended reducing the number of daily broadcasts since the news, in turn, makes news happen. But even the newsmakers themselves daily time their political alarm clocks to ring at nine p.m.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

IMPLICATIONS OF COLLAPSE OF JORDANIAN-PLO DIALOGUE ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 1, 8, 15 Mar 86

[Article by Salim Nassar: "Jordan and the PLO: a Final Separation or a Temporary Estrangement"]

[1 Mar 86 pp 14-15]

[Text] Has the door been closed on "that last opportunity" under the strategic Jordanian-Palestinian agreement of which King Husayn spoke of for a whole year?

Although King Husayn announced the end of the first round of peace efforts in the longest speech he ever delivered since becoming king 34 years ago, the door to political activity will remain slightly open, and an opportunity for dialogue will continue to exist. A new round of talks, which may differ from those of the 11 February 1985 Agreement, can thus be started. This is because a temporary hiatus or a deadlock would require the removal of barriers to negotiations and encourage the military option if the number of those opposing the peace process grows. Israel's prime minister took quick action to silence the advocates of war by asserting that he would not abandon the peace effort even if 1,000 obstacles were to emerge. Peres defended his government's position of refusing to negotiate with the PLO, and he said that King Husayn's failure to persuade Yasir 'Arafat to go along with the proposed formula gives Israel the right to refuse negotiations with the organization. In his address to the Knesset Peres announced that he would wait for King Husayn's next plan.

Under such cloudy political skies it was natural for Abu 'Ammar to take the initiative and rule out any negative effect on relations between Jordan and the organization. He reiterated his commitment to the 11 February Agreement and to everything required by common actions for peace. Abu 'Ammar explained that position at an AL-AHRAM symposium which was conducted by Lutfi al-Khuli. The Palestinian leader reviewed the previous stages that coincided with these formulas, and he said that he could not deal with Resolution 242 because it views the Palestinian people's question as a question of refugees and not as that of citizens with legitimate national rights. He defended his action to pull out at this critical stage by saying that Washington had turned down the three formulas that he had submitted to it through Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i. The first one of these formulas had been drawn up by a group of Palestinians, including four

academicians who understand how the American mind works. Dr Hasan al-Zayyat, Egypt's former minister of foreign affairs who happened to be in Amman at the time, took part in drawing up the second formula. That formula was presented to King Husayn by Dr al-Sharidi after sections were added that have to do with inviting the PLO to join a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation as an equal party to an international conference at the Security Council; that conference will be one that can take action. King Husayn then added a few terms he thought were necessary. But the Americans rejected that version unequivocally when it was submitted to them a second and then a third time. This is because the PLO had linked self-determination with all UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, and it had asked the United States for a written statement pledging support for Palestinian self-determination as stipulated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement.

But what are these previous resolutions that have to do with the question of Palestine? What are these resolutions that the U. S. administration conveyed to the Israeli government and then rejected?

To the Israeli government the most dangerous of these resolutions is UN Resolution 181 which was issued in 1947. That resolution called for the establishment of a Jewish-Arab state within what were then the borders of Palestine. The Jews had then agreed to the establishment of such a state. This resolution was followed by Resolution 194 of 1948 which called upon all Arab refugees, who had left Palestine, to return to their country provided they renounce the principle of compensation.

Peres and Shamir think that accepting these two resolutions would be tantamount to accepting the demise of the Jewish state and forgetting about the dreams for a greater Israel. It would also mean agreeing to the return of 3 million Palestinians. It seems that Richard Murphy, the U.S. assistant secretary of state was conveying the Israeli government's position when he said that Washington refuses to recognize the Palestinians' right to determine their own destiny because that would be tantamount to agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state. When he examined the three formulas, he indicated that the United States regarded the Palestinian question as more than a refugee problem. That is why the United States supports Palestinian autonomy in a partnership with Jordan, but it is reluctant to reach a position on Palestinian rights without negotiations. It is Mr Murphy's opinion that self-determination for Palestinians must be considered within a regional framework. This means that Washington does not agree to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Instead, it wants autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza in return for rejecting Israel's occupation or annexation of territories it occupied in 1967.

According to Palestinian sources the British are saying that Sir Geoffrey Howe, the foreign secretary, was the one who proposed adding the English word, "pertinent." This is the word that made Americans wary and cautious because it linked the resolution recognizing Israel, Resolution 242, with two other UN resolutions, 181 and 194, thereby creating considerable ambiguity regarding the Palestinian state. This was not the first time for the British to come up with ambiguous formulas. Resolution 242, which was composed by George Brown and rewritten by Lord Carrington, is a most ambiguous resolution because it can be

interpreted in more than one way. Israel's interpretation of "withdrawing from territory" gives it an excuse not to withdraw from all the land it occupied because the withdrawal is not specified. The same objection applies to the phrase, "secure and recognized boundaries." The resolution did not define what is meant by a just and lasting peace, nor did it define the final boundaries. Such ambiguity is sought deliberately to give negotiators opportunities to rely on their own competence and cunning to make new gains in the course of negotiations only. Resolution 242 was written in a manner that would require negotiators to resolve those ambiguities. When a resolution is not understood and when it is ambiguous, difficult to apply and needs interpretation, then the need for negotiations between the parties to a dispute remains a basic condition for resolving the crisis.

The February Agreement and the Estrangement or Separation of Jordanians and Palestinians

The question that is being asked now in Arab capitals has to do with Jordan's attitude toward Abu 'Ammar. What will happen next when all the factors for peace or war converge?

Arab diplomats in Amman are saying that Jordan's position is leaning toward stepping up actions against Abu 'Ammar. Evidence they cite begins with King Husayn's address which denied the PLO leader's commitment and credibility. The evidence includes the declaration made by Jordan's parliament at its recent meeting. The Parliament declared that Jordan had adopted the Palestinian question even before the PLO was founded. The evidence also includes official statements asking Palestinians to come out with a new decision about who should represent them. This stepped up campaign against 'Arafat will inevitably lead to the demise of the February Agreement and the cancellation of the partnership between Jordanians and Palestinians. It may also strip the PLO of its legitimacy and its status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

Apprehensive about the consequences of the collapse of the talks, the PLO's leaders sent Abu Iyad to Amman to mend fences, to stop the stepped up campaign against 'Arafat and contain its consequences with the assertion that, "We've agreed to disagree." Abu Iyad thinks that differences in points of view must be based on accord and on an appreciation of circumstances. Thus bilateral relations between Jordanians and Palestinians would not be affected by this setback, and the strategic Jordanian-Palestinian agreement would not have to be abandoned. Observers are interpreting this cautious step as a final attempt to forestall the failure of the peace process by describing what is happening between Jordan and the PLO as a "temporary estrangement" rather than a "final separation."

The PLO was expected to issue a detailed statement about the recent crisis in which Abu 'Ammar would reaffirm his commitment to the Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement and his willingness to attend an international conference that can take political action to grant the Palestinians their right to determine their own destiny. Abu 'Ammar thus wanted a temporary, not a permanent suspension of the Amman talks, after holding the Americans responsible for the failure. The statement would affirm that Washington's conditions would have no negative effect on relations between Jordan and the organization. But the statement was

delayed for numerous considerations, most importantly the stepped up campaign against Abu 'Ammar and the effect the failure of the talks had on bilateral relations. All the evidence indicates that Amman is willing to endorse a new political step that could end its partnership with the PLO.

Abu 'Ammar's opponents are critical of his political move. They say that as leader of the Palestinian Revolution he cannot write himself off and agree to Resolution 242 because recognition of that resolution would be tantamount to the merciful execution of his own as well as his colleagues' struggle. Recognition of Resolution 242 would mean the merciful execution of the constitution to whose articles he has been committed. 'Arafat's opponents are saying that no one but the Palestine National Council [PNC] can accept Resolution 242, because the council is the highest legislative authority in Palestinian politics. This means that 'Arafat, members of the PLO's Executive Committee, or members of Fatah's Central Committee cannot unilaterally accept a historical resolution such as Resolution 242 without checking with the PNC. Jordanians are blaming 'Arafat and criticizing his reluctance in that regard because he wasted time procrastinating and delaying matters without stating an unequivocal opinion on the resolution. But 'Arafat justifies his procrastination by saying that he was exploring the U.S. position and its willingness to link Resolution 242 with self-determination for the Palestinians even in the context of a confederation with Jordan, as was mentioned in the three formulas that were sent to Washington.

Abu 'Ammar states that he gave King Husayn his preliminary approval when the king visited Washington in late May 1985. The Jordanian monarch then announced this common desire in a statement he made in front of the White House. The king then said, "I have assured President Reagan that in light of the Palestinian-Jordanian Agreement signed on 11 February, and as a result of my talks with the PLO, and on the basis of our confirmed desire for peace, we"--that is, the king and the PLO--"are willing to negotiate in the context of an international conference that would be convened to achieve a peaceful settlement based on UN pertinent resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."

Despite that opportunity, described by the Jordanian monarch as "a unique opportunity for peace," the U.S. position remained unable to expand its international umbrella and commit itself to an unambiguous policy that would involve more than its mere attendance at the Security Council. That is why Abu 'Ammar was apprehensive, and that is why he feared that the international conference would turn into a mere effort for mediation and reconciliation after which direct talks would be resumed. That is why he asked the United States to give the Jordanian monarch a written pledge that it would support the Palestinians' right to determine their own destiny as stipulated by the Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement. Murphy declined to make such a pledge because, in his opinion, such a pledge would be equivalent to agreeing to establish an independent Palestinian state. Murphy is convinced that the United States should not impose a solution, but that it should help the conflicting parties find a solution themselves. Since the parties in the conflict must also be the parties in the peace, they have tried regularly to drag the superpowers into the conflict and win their support for their efforts to reach a settlement. But when Washington felt that it was being asked to share the responsibility with the PLO, it pulled back because it feared the effect of Israel's pressure. The PLO also pulled back

because it feared what the rejection front and Arab countries opposed to such action might do.

Israel, the PLO and Resolution 242

One of the questions frequently asked by those who are trying to find a political solution to the crisis in the Middle East is this: Can those who were involved in wars with Israel forge a peace with that country?

In the course of his observations on actions that are taken to achieve peace Abu 'Ammar would always tell his colleagues that he would never choose a position that would turn him into a Palestinian al-Sadat. This is evident in how the peace process has been pushed forward only to be aborted by the use of force or by the refusal to pursue a course that would promote progress in the talks. In 1977 'Arafat faced a difficult situation with regard to Resolution 242, and he was at a loss how to react to the test of settling the ongoing conflict between him and those who were calling for a military solution. That happened after King Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who was then the crown prince, returned from Washington after meeting with President Carter. King Fahd had talked with President Carter about the Middle East crisis and had given the president a complete file on the Palestinian question. At the end of the Saudi official's visit the U.S. president indicated that he was touched by the justice of the problem, and he said that reading the file had created in him a sense that an international umbrella had to be provided to ensure a political solution to the problem. President Carter said he would be willing to receive Yasir 'Arafat in the White House as the chief of an independent Palestinian state, provided that 'Arafat recognize Resolution 242. When the idea was proposed to Abu 'Ammar, he presented it to the PLO's leaders, and they decided to accept it. But as usual in such affairs, Abu 'Ammar proposed that idea in a manner that provoked the opposition of the National Movement in Lebanon. He was thus compelled to qualify his written approval, and those qualifications made any progress for peace difficult to achieve.

A sense of apprehension about what the stage of talks might yield may be what is causing Abu 'Ammar to avoid taking action and settling the matter of trading land for peace. To 'Arafat Palestinian negotiators are in a tight spot because they lost many of their military and political options with Arab countries and in the international community. Although 'Arafat would have the legitimate right to negotiate if he recognized Resolution 242, the peace that is being proposed may be exploited by Israel to add conditions that may be difficult to achieve. Palestinian negotiators would then have lost their option on the land, and they would have given up their option to fight. Such a situation could put an end to the Palestinian struggle, and it would create new political facts that would put an end to the PLO and its followers.

When the Palestine National Council met in Cairo in March 1977 Yasir 'Arafat addressed PNC members and spoke to them about Waldheim's mission in the area. He told them how the UN secretary general had met with some PLO representatives, including Basil 'Aql and Muhsin Abu Mayzar when he was visiting Damascus. Waldheim told everybody that the superpowers had entrusted him with a conciliatory mission that required making preparations for an international conference in Geneva. That is why it was incumbent upon him to activate the

peace process in the context of a conference that would deal with peace in the Middle East. After Waldheim ended his tour in the Middle East, he went to the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo where he told Yasir 'Arafat, "I met the head of the Israeli government, Yitzhak Rabin, and his deputy, the minister of foreign affairs, Yigal Allon. I explained to them the point of view of the superpowers in question and the possibility of convening a conference in Geneva that would be attended by Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel and the PLO. That conference would be sponsored by the countries that are members of the UN Security Council. But when I started talking about a scenario for the settlement and the idea of trading land for peace through Resolution 242 as well as other resolutions that have to do with the Palestinian people's right to determine their own destiny, to become independent and to receive compensation, Rabin"--the current minister of defense"--looked at me and spoke tersely. Rabin said, 'Let it be known that the Israeli government will not recognize the PLO even if the PLO recognized Israel. Israel will refuse to accept that recognition.'"

That incident stuck in Abu 'Ammar's memory as a reminder of Israel's unswerving and fixed policy. It created in his mind a firm conviction that trading land for peace would be nothing more than a protracted process whose purpose would be to deplete Arab momentum and drain Palestinian fighters. For 17 years 'Arafat has been trying to ensure a Palestinian consensus to regain part of the land that has been stolen in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Because no such consensus has evolved and because such a consensus is difficult to achieve after the departure of the armed resistance from Lebanon, 'Arafat discovered that he is unable to realize the second objective. And that is 'Arafat's real dilemma: he fell into the trap of a conflict between what is useful for his survival as chairman of the PLO and what is good for the survival of the cause in the hearts of those who are fighting for it.

Next week Salim Nassar will resume this discussion. He will be writing about the period that followed the collapse of the Amman talks and about the mercy killing of the Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement.

[8 Mar 86 p 14]

[Text] Why Moscow Refused To Receive Abu 'Ammar as Head of the Palestinian Delegation

What will the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee do now after the recent talks in Amman collapsed?

The political decision had focused on issuing a brief statement in which Yasir 'Arafat would explain why the three American formulas were not accepted. He thought that Washington would not recognize the PLO even if the PLO accepted Resolution 242. But 'Arafat postponed taking that position, and he did not issue the statement of clarifications. It were as though he did not wish to intensify the dispute with Jordan and become involved in the media campaign which Amman had initiated. That is why he decided to contain the problem and to go to Moscow so as to ensure a political cover. He expected his visit to Moscow to be seen as some kind of gesture by means of which Moscow would embrace his recent decision. But the Soviet response was disappointing because the Soviets wanted Abu 'Ammar to go as a member of the delegation and not as its leader. When 'Arafat declined

to go to Moscow under that condition, Moscow suggested that Abu-al-Lutf go in his place. That compromise would not anger Damascus, and it would not provoke Amman. This was important because 'Arafat's visit was to coincide with the 27th annual congress for the Communist party. It also coincided with preparations that were being made for starting a new international climate with the United States.

Observers in Arab capitals took the Soviet condition to mean a new lesson in dealing with the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee. At the very least, the Soviet condition meant that Moscow was endorsing the role of an alternate--that is, Abu-al-Lutf--a man to whom Moscow always alludes. Moscow considers Abu-al-Lutf its preferred candidate to inherit the leadership of the organization. 'Arafat, however, sees Moscow's position as one that is calculated. He does not think it is intended to overlook or minimize the importance of his role as much as it is a calculated action that would set in motion a political move to unite Palestinian leaders after the failure of the American mediation effort. 'Arafat argues that Soviet ambassadors in Baghdad, San'a' and Amman continued to visit him while the talks were underway, and they encouraged him to reject Resolution 242 because the Soviet Union had not joined the United States in considering any arrangement pertaining to an international conference. Such advice may have been one of the most important reasons that prompted 'Arafat to turn down the American proposals because recognition without the conference would have spontaneously aborted the pledge by the Reagan administration.

Some information was revealed this week about the final offer that was made by Cluverius, Murphy's special assistant in the peace process. This is the offer that is made up of two separate paragraphs.

Paragraph A states that the PLO would be willing to recognize Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 within the framework of an international conference convened to achieve a peaceful settlement in the light of the Palestinian-Jordanian Agreement.

Paragraph B, which is printed on a separate sheet of paper, states that the PLO would continue its efforts through the international conference to carry out UN resolutions that are related to the Middle East crisis and to the Palestinians' right to determine their own destiny. When Cluverius objected to the proposal, he told mediators that his country would abide by the first paragraph and recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. That would solve the Kissinger problem and bring the PLO to the negotiating table. But since Washington would not be bound by the second paragraph, then the matter of self-determination would remain tied to Israel's position and to the magnitude of international pressures on it.

Abu Iyad, who had rejected Murphy's plan last spring when the Executive Committee and the Central Committee were meeting in Baghdad, announced he was rejecting Cluverius's plan. Abu Iyad said that with this plan Reagan hoped to upset the Palestinian political position, more than the war in Lebanon had already upset it militarily. That brought to mind what Ibrahim Kamil, Egypt's former minister of foreign affairs had written about Israel's twisted methods in dealing with Egypt. Mr Kamil described how Israel had contravened the principles of the agreement and turned the Camp David Accords into a trap for Anwar

al-Sadat. Abu Iyad thought that after Israel gets the recognition of its existence in accordance with the first paragraph of the plan, it will refuse to acknowledge the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

One day after the talks failed, the PLO's leaders suggested that Abu 'Ammar stay in Amman as long as possible to prevent the collapse of Jordanian-Palestinian relations. But 'Arafat's presence in the Jordanian capital was undesirable since all officials were trying to find out from the delegation accompanying him when he was going to leave. Their tone indicated that the desire that he leave the country was official. Abu Iyad was asked to go to Amman immediately to help contain the crisis before matters got worse. At the same time Cluverius went to Israel where he explained to Shimon Peres the circumstances of the talks and informed him that the peace process to which Murphy had assigned him was dead. But the prime minister of Israel refused to accept that situation, arguing that it was the Jordanian-Palestinian talks that had failed. Peres said that his country would continue to push for progress in the peace effort, and he accused the Soviet Union of applying pressure on Abu 'Ammar to refuse to recognize Resolution 242. He declared in an interview published by American newspapers that Jordan could effect a breakthrough in the negotiations: on the one hand, it could join Egypt and the United States in putting pressure on the PLO once again; and, on the other hand, it could join Syria without the PLO.

But all those doors have now been closed. Jordan is raising doubts about the legitimacy of the PLO's representation of the Palestinians, and it is asking the Arab League to convene a conference that would reconsider that responsibility. Jordan thinks that Abu 'Ammar, preoccupied with the problems of government, has not devoted enough attention to efforts to regain the land. In this regard Jordan sees eye to eye with Damascus, which believes that the mere acceptance of the principle that land would be traded for peace is a declaration that the battle to liberate all the land is being relinquished. That Syrian position became quite evident in the talks that Mr Faruq al-Shar', the foreign minister, had with Mrs Thatcher and Minister Geoffrey Howe. Mr al-Shar' closed the door to the American peace process and said that going back to the historical roots and political causes of the Palestinian question remained the best solution to the problem. The reasons for terrorism would thus be eliminated, and Palestinian rights and occupied Arab lands would be regained. Mr al-Shar' criticized U.S. policy and European initiatives which give Israel the right to a new mandate in the region by supporting the principle of negotiations with pre-conditions, such as the occupation of land and the usurpation of Jerusalem as Israel's permanent capital.

It seems that what happened in Egypt recently was not unrelated to this crisis. That is why Abu 'Ammar left Cairo feeling that President Mubarak would not be able to make a new effort in the peace initiative because of objections that exist to Camp David. The domestic crisis that erupted [in Egypt] after the failure of the Amman talks prevented Cairo from doing anything in that regard. The burning of the American hotel and the hotel where talks with Israel were held were the clearest indicators that the open-door policy and everything it entailed were being rejected.

Salim Nassar will resume this series next week when he writes the third article in the series about alternatives to the failure of U.S. initiatives in the region.

[15 Mar 86 pp 18-19]

[Text] Israel Prepares To Annex the West Bank

Will the Palestine National Council be convened to elect a collective leadership for the organization?

The PLO issued a statement whose tone was calm, flexible and liberal clarifying King Husayn's address. It concentrated its political attack on the United States, regarding its position, which is allied with Israel, as one that will impede every effort that is made to achieve a just peace in the Middle East. Then an interview with the PLO's chairman, Yasir 'Arafat was published in AL-QABAS Newspaper and AL-YAWM AL-SABI' Magazine [The Seventh Day]. That interview closed all channels of communication with Amman and wiped out every effect left behind by the year-long effort to normalize Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the aftermath of the Jordanian monarch's address it was normal for the peace talks to be frozen and for the PLO to disavow the consequences of Resolution 242 and everything that was imposed on it by those who wanted to reach a settlement. This is what is building up the fear in international circles that the failure to reach a solution to the Palestinian question while Shimon Peres is in office could jeopardize the peace process with Egypt. Israel could go back to where it started as the debate about its historical legitimacy in the region starts all over again. Faruq al-Shar', Syria's minister of foreign affairs, emphasized this point in particular during his talks in London and Vienna, especially when Mrs Margaret Thatcher raised the subject of terrorism and the dangers of Yitzhak Shamir becoming prime minister next October. The Syrian minister told Mrs Thatcher that the Likud and the Labor party were two sides of the same coin. He told her that the United States had lost its bet to foil the existing coalition and bring to power a Labor Party majority which would assume the leadership for a settlement after talks between Amman and Yasir 'Arafat collapsed.

It seems that opposition parties in Israel tried to take advantage of the fact that the formula of trading land for peace had failed. Last week it put the matter of annexing the West Bank and Gaza to a vote. Peres warned against the demographic danger of such an action during the debate, and he indicated that annexation could undermine the Jewish state's objective to preserve its character. It would violate the Camp David Agreement with Egypt, and it would escalate the atmosphere of war with Syria. Aba Eban, who described that session as a mere test of what the Likud coalition would do over the next 2 years when Shamir serves his term as prime minister, supported Peres's position. Aba Eban thinks that the increase in the number of Arab residents on the West Bank and Gaza Strip will make the Jews a minority by the end of the century. This means that in the nineties Israel will face the danger of internal, political and social fragmentation. As a result, there will be numerous denominations and ethnic groups and communities. In light of these warnings the Labor Party, which considers itself the historical founder of the Jewish state, agreed to grant the Palestinians an entity on the West Bank. That entity, which would not be independent and would be disarmed, would depend administratively and politically on Jordan and Israel. But that choice was no longer adequate to move the peace talks forward after the PLO withdrew from the settlement in a manner that precluded common action.

The U.S. administration sent Richard Murphy this week on an urgent mission to the region to conduct talks with Arab and Israeli leaders. In the course of those talks Murphy tried to explain Reagan's policy and justify its inability to break the deadlock in the peace process because of Israel's contradictory decision and the Palestinian position which opposes it. American bets may have been based on erroneous expectations about the possibility that Abu 'Ammar might approve Resolution 242. If such a step would materialize, it would give Peres an opportunity to end the frail coalition and hold new elections from which the Labor Party could emerge a stronger force. But since these possibilities have collapsed, Murphy is going to the Middle East with new choices [to try] to bring about a breakthrough in three areas in the policy to revive the settlement.

1. Putting pressure on Israel to make it reconsider the possibility of holding talks on withdrawing from the Golan and accepting the Soviet Union as a principal partner in the international conference.

2. Dealing with Syria as a state authorized by Arabs and Palestinians to deal with numerous questions that are pending in the region, such as the war between Iraq and Iran, the Lebanese crisis, or the various aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

3. Making an effort to get the countries of the region out of the cycle of war, particularly since peace plans made an outbreak of hostilities likely. This is what the newspaper, AL-BA'TH, suggested when it warned against Israeli preparations for a broad-based military adventure against Syria.

The Americans are saying that the failure of the peace talks has strengthened the conviction that the Soviets have succeeded in ending the settlement that Washington had prepared without them. This means that it would be difficult to keep the Soviets out of any solution to the Middle East crisis. However, the desire to bring them into the circle of the regional conflict runs counter to the Pentagon's plans and the plans made by the powers that control major economic and industrial sources. That is why Reagan discovered there was no consensus within the administration and Congress favoring regional solutions over strategic interests and considerations, which regard the Soviet Union as a primary threat to the West's influence in various regions of the world. The other perplexing question is manifested in the extent to which the United States is willing to share an international role in the region with Moscow as well as the extent to which the Israeli government will go along with the concessions it is being asked to make.

The Future of the West Bank and Israel Proper

European capitals think that the announcement that coordination between Jordan and the PLO would be frozen constitutes a lost opportunity to achieve peace. Margaret Thatcher says that Shimon Peres has lost hope of stabilizing his political course. She says that will bring Shamir to the prime minister's position next October. Mrs Thatcher is saying that 1986 will be a calm year, compared to the dangers that 1987 and 1988 will bring when Yitzhaq Shamir is in office. Mrs Thatcher thus agrees with King Husayn, who is expecting violent clashes in the Likud's administration, because Sharon will become the prime

architect of Shamir's policy. He will become the chief executive of the expansionist plans on the West Bank or in south Lebanon. This means that he will contrive problems to force people to leave those areas or to expel them to the east to create demographic or social upheaval in the Jordanian kingdom. Since he considers Jordan the alternative homeland for Palestinians, Sharon opposes a settlement on the future of the West Bank because maintaining the West Bank's status quo is necessary to keep opportunities for geographical expansion open.

Observers expect the policy of the Likud and extremist religious parties in Israel to create conflicts with Labor Party leaders who consider a non-violent plan to rid the West Bank of Arabs one way of getting foreign aid. This is because oppressive practices against Palestinians who have been denied their political rights will cause Israel to lose the means it has used for 40 years to get money from other countries. In the eyes of the free world Israel will lose the quality of being "a civilized country." In addition to these factors the policy of subjugating neighboring peoples to the law of tyranny will threaten Israel's stability and security and will affect morale in the army and in the regime. That is what happened in the case of south Lebanon.

However, the Likud coalition's policy stems from different assumptions which were summarized by Shamir and Sharon in an anti-peace strategy with the Arabs. The most important items of that strategy are:

1. To create conditions inside the West Bank that would induce Palestinians to leave the area and go to Jordan. The purpose of this is to turn Palestinians into a minority in other societies and to keep revolutionary forces far from the borders of greater Israel.
2. To make an effort to create geographical, political and human facts that would require expansion within the West Bank so as to allow for new immigrants from the Soviet Union, from the countries of eastern Europe and from the United States. The goal is to make the population of Israel exceed 7 million persons by the end of this century.
3. To abolish the idea of trading land for peace because Arab countries do not have an agreement about a solution, and they are unable to use military force to capture the land. Since Arab disunity has weakened the position of the Arab negotiator, accepting the principle of a settlement is considered an Israeli concession that should not be made as the Labor Party seems to be making it.
4. To make preparations while the Likud is in power for launching a military strike against Syria before Syria arms itself and completes preparations which are based on a strategic balance, or before Syria launches a sudden strike against Israel that it would coordinate with Jordan, just as it did in 1973 in conjunction with Egypt.

To the Arab countries this policy constitutes a new situation that is comparable only to that which developed when Menahem Begin was in office. Opposition forces within the government coalition may succeed in delaying some questions, but they will definitely be unable to resolve vital problems, chief among which is the agreement among all parties over the creation of a strong regional state that

would not be restricted by geographical conditions such as those that are being imposed by the Palestinian Resistance on the West Bank and in Gaza, or those that are being imposed by the Lebanese Resistance in south Lebanon or by Syrian preparations around the Golan. These strategic requirements for Israel's security make its borders unsettled on all fronts. They also keep Israel in a constant state of alert against possible dangers.

'Arafat between Separation and Estrangement

After King Husayn announced that the Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement was no longer in effect, the other party's opportunity to "negotiate" expired. That opportunity had been proposed by Shimon Peres at the General Assembly. Since Arab extremism generates Israeli extremism and vice versa, Abu 'Ammar's recent declaration in the newspaper, AL-QABAS, was interpreted by his opponents as a strategic retreat disguised as a tactical review. No matter how contradictory individual interpretations of his political position are, all tendencies of the Palestinian forces are making preparations for a collective decision that will be based on new facts on the Egyptian scene and inside the West Bank, particularly since the separation that was announced by both parties--King Husayn and 'Arafat--left a vacuum in Jordanian-Palestinian relations. That vacuum is considered to be a blow to the coordination formula, and it is also considered to be a blow to the "land for peace" slogan.

Statements made by Yasir 'Arafat may cause one to conclude that he will continue to defend himself until a new international opportunity presents itself that would allow him to emerge into a new role. One notices that 'Arafat exploited reactions against the assassination of Zafir al-Masri, the mayor of Nablus. It is expected that West Bank residents will be used to revive his frozen role, and it is also expected that campaigns between him and the Popular Front will be escalated in the aftermath of Dr George Habash's address. In that address Habash called for the formation of a reliable collective leadership for the PLO. Abu 'Ammar ruled out the possibility of convening the PNC because he is convinced that opposition forces would turn it into a courtroom and demand the establishment of a collective leadership. The Soviet Union may be behind that new course of action which was welcomed by the Popular Front and supported by the Democratic Front and the Palestinian Communist Party. Based on preparations that would be made for the coming stage, it is assumed that Palestinian leaders would meet in 3 years at the 17th session of the Palestine National Council to plan a political course that would be compatible with regional and international changes. Syria and Jordan might not oppose such a course even though it might be impossible to carry out.

But before such an attempt is made, there are numerous pitfalls that could lead Abu 'Ammar to up the political ante and step up the military position inside the West Bank and south Lebanon, especially since the Palestine National Council will look into the creation of a collective leadership that would limit his authority. The PLO chief will also propose a new plan to resolve the crisis that Palestinians found themselves in when they were forced to choose between two diametrically opposed choices: war and peace together. This is exactly what happened in Jordan and in Lebanon through a policy of alternating the revolution and the state. The result of that policy was a double bind in which the state was lost, and the revolution dissipated.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

SALAH KHALAF ON POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 12-18 Mar 86 p 17

[Interview with Salah Khalaf: "Abu Iyad Calls for Reconsideration of the Cairo Declaration, Tells AL-MAJALLAH, 'We Started a Stage of Covert Activities; Execution of Spies Will Be Resumed;" in Tunisia; date not specified]

[Text] Salah Khalaf, [alias] Abu Iyad, is the second man in Fatah and the Palestinian Revolution's security official. In this interview conducted with him in Tunisia, Mr Khalaf talked about the assassination phenomenon. He called for reconsideration of the Cairo Declaration which stipulated that foreign operations be stopped. Salah Khalaf indicated that Fatah would resume its policy of executing those he called "spies and people who do business with the enemy." The text of the interview follows.

[Question] There are organizations that declared responsibility for the assassination of Zafir al-Masri. How do you explain that, and who, do you think, was responsible for that assassination?

[Answer] I think Israel's Mosad is the only organization whose interests are served by al-Masri's death because his appointment mayor of Nablus was part of the unilateral implementation of the autonomy plan. One condition to his appointment was that he not interfere in political matters. But al-Masri, who was an enthusiastic patriot, continued to affirm that the PLO was responsible for the Palestinian question. His last statement in that regard was made after King Husayn's address. In that statement al-Masri announced he was committed to the organization and would abide by its decisions.

[Question] Since al-Masri's family is calling for revenge, there are those who expect a Palestinian civil war to break out on the West Bank and in other areas.

[Answer] That is why I said that Israel was the only beneficiary of the assassination. But I believe that our people, who believe in a democratic dialogue and who turned al-Masri's funeral into a referendum on their patriotism and commitment to the PLO, could never fall into such a trap. I must not forget to mention here that violations of the democratic dialogue slogan began in 1978 when Sa'id Hamami was assassinated in London. That is why Palestinians have reaffirmed that getting rid of Hamami served Israel's interests and no one else's. That is why I think that the PFLP's declaration of responsibility for

that assassination was nothing but a deviation from its former course: the PFLP recognized an operation it had nothing to do with. Even if the front were involved in that action, I believe that it was forced into it by a shady organization.

[Question] It is known that Dr Wadi' Haddad, the second founder of the PFLP, supported covert activities and special operations, but he never used his weapons against Arab or Palestinian targets. Where did this new wave on the Palestinian scene come from?

[Answer] When he was alive, Dr Wadi' Haddad disagreed with his colleagues. There were three tendencies. The first one believed in taking action inside the occupied land only. Those who followed the second tendency, which opposed the first, thought that actions taken abroad were the foundation of their efforts. I believe that those who adopted the assassination of al-Masri followed that tendency. The third tendency, which was led by Dr Wadi' Haddad, split from the front after 1975. People who followed that tendency believed in taking action inside the occupied land and abroad. They relied on the theory that killing any Israeli or American official anywhere in the world was an inseparable part of the Palestinian people's struggle against occupation. Wadi' Haddad had his own methodology and philosophy of action which is based on the theory of pursuing the enemy everywhere. He rejected the killing of any Arab or Palestinian even if he subscribed to an opinion different from his own. Let me state here for the record that Arab organizations tried to get him involved in the elimination of Palestinians, but he refused that adamantly because he had no ties with any Arab intelligence organization.

Resumption of Foreign Operations

[Question] You stopped foreign operations a long time ago. Are you still adhering to that policy?

[Answer] We think that actions inside the occupied land constitute the foundation of our efforts. In 1974 our National Council decided to stop foreign activities at the request of Arab countries who recognized the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. That decision was made because some of us believed that a glimmer of hope for a political solution was appearing on the horizon. Others, however, were convinced that liberation could only be achieved by using weapons. And now that we can review what happened in the past, we will find that the consequences of our past experiences were nothing more than setbacks, conspiracies against our revolution and our people, and attempts to shirk commitments made to our people and the PLO. Consequently, some people began to flout the PLO because they thought it was dead and powerless. That is why I believe we must reconsider the aforementioned decision. The recent Cairo Declaration must be reconsidered, especially since the other party violated the declaration and continued its operations against us. I am saying that all our previous military and diplomatic policies must be reconsidered. This is important because some people now believe that we have become a burden to them. Let me say here that the cycle of covert activities has been started once again. We are in the process of expanding that cycle, and we will expand it. We will soon prove what we are saying this time.

[Question] Doesn't this mean that you may become involved in a cycle of political assassinations, which you have been warning against?

[Answer] I mean every word I say, and I'm aware of every word I say. There is a difference between political assassinations and executing spies and traitors. We will not sit in judgment on patriots and fellow citizens with whose opinions and independent interpretations we disagree, but let me say unequivocally and affirmatively that we will not hesitate to carry out any action against those who secretly and publicly fight against our revolution.

[Question] Don't you believe that this will increase efforts to pursue you? Palestinian leaders have been targeted for a long time, and they are being pursued by assassins whose guns are equipped with silencers.

[Answer] That is not new. Let me say here that if Israel has been trying to chase us away with its airplanes, and if others have been hounding us with their "silencers," others have been trying to assassinate us politically. And that is even more dangerous because their objective is to put an end to our cause. Those people have been trying to force us into a significant departure from our understanding of the problem and our conditions, chief among which is the right for self-determination and the right to establish our state. Those who have been trying to force us to accept Resolution 242 are trying to assassinate us politically. But we will not be silenced, and we will not make it possible for them to do that.

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLANS TO RESTRUCTURE PLO CONSIDERED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 12-18 Mar 86 pp 17-18

[Article by Salih Qallab: "Secret PLO Organizational Decisions Made after Reaction to the Collapse of Coordination with Jordan; 'Generals' of the Liberation Army Asked To Retire; PLO Reorganized To Restore Vigor and Stop Excesses"]

[Text] The recent Palestinian declaration in which the PLO expressed its reaction to King Husayn's address was preceded by heated and serious communications, deliberations and discussions that involved a broad sector of Palestinian cadres as well as Arab and foreign organizations and countries that are directly related to the region's developments and the PLO's positions.

What Abu 'Ammar and his colleagues in the foremost rank feared from the earliest moments was a repetition of the painful experiences of the past. They feared the onset of conflict and controversy among Palestinian officials; they feared that statements would be made and countered; and they feared there would be a state of utter confusion, similar to that which happened after the Palestinian leader's first visit to Cairo and on the eve of signing the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement last February.

Because Abu 'Ammar was concerned about keeping matters under control and keeping Palestinian leaders in control of the situation, he issued a decree barring bureau officials and "habitual" statement makers from indulging their habit this time because conditions were critical and the situation was dangerous. Any action that was not calculated could lead to a national disaster in light of the PLO's intense presence in Jordan. Abu 'Ammar did not want anything to infringe upon historical relations between Jordanians and Palestinians.

Although the information that Abu 'Ammar gathered while he was in Amman assured him that the Jordanian monarch would sooner or later do what he did do, Abu 'Ammar chose to tarry and wait and watch developments closely. During the days that preceded King Husayn's address, he was engaged in a series of communications. In addition, he made two visits. First, he visited Bucharest where he conducted lengthy talks with Romanian president Ceausescu; and second, he visited Cairo where President Mubarak told him about Egypt's attitude toward developments in Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

Ceausescu, who was the first to propose the idea of an international conference and who was the indirect link between the United States and the PLO, did more listening to 'Arafat this time than speaking. He thought that the Palestinian cause would suffer certain disaster if the PLO were to retreat one inch from its last stances. Ceausescu advised the Palestinian leader to play his hand carefully and unemotionally in accordance with careful and well-considered calculations.

Abu 'Ammar also received similar advice in Egypt along with an unequivocal plea to keep the doors with Jordan open. That plea was reiterated in a letter carried to Tunisia by Sa'id Kamal when Palestinian meetings there were in full swing. The Palestinian leader was asked not to respond to King Husayn's address at all and to let matters cool down so that action can be taken eventually to mend the rift and restore "the warm friendship that has been lost."

Palestinian officials report that Egyptian officials asked 'Arafat to tone down his actual hard-line somewhat and to talk about the Palestinian people exercising their right to determine their own destiny instead of talking about the right for self-determination.

Three Tendencies

Although Palestinian leaders are now fully aware that recent events in Cairo and their consequences will keep President Mubarak preoccupied for a long time, they have concluded, as they considered matters and examined their options, that Cairo is still willing to continue its efforts in three directions.

--First, Cairo is willing to work with Jordan to persuade it not to follow this course of action to its conclusion.

--Second, Cairo is willing to work with western Europe to induce it to take action to resolve the current crisis.

--Third, Cairo is willing to work with the United States to induce it to meet the PLO's three proposals halfway.

It seems that the willingness of Mubarak's government to help induced some Palestinian leaders to opt for waiting before announcing a response to the Jordanian step. Their feelings in favor of waiting were strengthened when they heard from official Arab sources that the results of communications with the American administration after King Husayn's address were not negative. Palestinian leaders were told that the Americans were still listening to those who were telling them that the PLO was an existing fact in the Middle East and that its legitimacy as a representative of the Palestinian people was confirmed by the demonstrations and marches that accompanied the funeral of the mayor of Nablus who was recently assassinated on the West Bank.

Although linkage between what is being said and Murphy's scheduled visit to Tunisia early this week, where all the Palestinian leaders are, could be no more than a matter of individual interpretation, it is certain that what Amman fears most at this time in particular is an attempt by the Reagan administration to find a new channel for talking with the PLO that does not involve Jordan. That is why Jordan is closely following actions by Tunisia and Morocco.

Trends and Opinions

The nature of the dialogue that prevailed among Palestinian ranks on the eve of their response to the Jordanian monarch's address is made clear by the first meeting that was convened by Palestinian leaders to look into the subject of that response. That meeting was not attended by Abu Jihad, who stayed in Jordan at the request of the command, and it was not attended by Khalid al-Hasan, who was in Kuwait. At that meeting several draft statements were discussed; all of them revolved around three positions that were simultaneously far from and close to each other. The first position was adopted by the "hawks" among the leaders; it called for a final break with Jordan and the abrogation of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement. The second position, which was adopted by "the doves," called for the principle of "turning the other cheek." The third position called upon Palestinians to appear flexible but to maintain a hard-line substantive posture. It was that position, which was adopted by Yasir 'Arafat and his colleagues, that finally prevailed.

Despite these three positions which reflect different appraisals of the actual balances of power, an absolute majority of Palestinians in Palestinian leadership circles feel that the PLO's position is stronger now than it was in the past, particularly in the aftermath of what happened in the West Bank and after some East Bank activists declared their positions. These circles concur that the Palestinian response must be free from the derogatory remarks and passionate emotions which usually characterize Arab disputes.

Secret Decisions

One may notice from what is happening within the PLO that Palestinian leaders, perhaps for the first time in over 20 years, are free from fear for their positions, their organizations and their image in the country in question when making their decisions.

Palestinian leaders made another decision not to retract any position they took and not to make any new concessions even if that meant shutting down all the offices and organizations that were established in Amman during the last 3 years. The PLO basically considers these offices and organizations, including the camps of the Badr and al-Karamah forces, a burden to it and to the Palestinian Resistance.

A majority of Palestinian leaders, however, are trying to see to it that matters do not go that far, even though they consider shutting down the offices of WAFA, the Palestinian News Agency in Amman, to be the beginning of the end. Palestinian leaders are also trying to see to it that the PLO's official office is not closed, even if all other offices and organizations are. They want to keep the PLO's official office open because it symbolizes strategic relations between the PLO and the Jordanian government.

Questions and Possibilities

It must be affirmed here that all Palestinian leaders without exception have no agreement about the reasons that impelled the Jordanian monarch to take that step which he did take. Some are saying that Jordan believes that all opportunities to persuade the PLO about Jordanian fears for the future of the

occupied land have been exhausted. Others are saying that Jordan has despaired of the possibility of persuading those who are supposed to be its partners that what is important is to get the negotiations started, not to proclaim the slogan of self-determination in the face of what the Jordanian administration is proposing.

In addition to all that, there are those who are wondering if the Jordanian monarch's step has anything to do with forestalling the Likud's return to power in the coming Israeli elections that may be held. Some are wondering whether what the Jordanian monarch did had anything to do with his rapprochement with Syria and with the fears of the entire area, including what is being said daily about solving the Palestinian question in Jordan and turning the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan into "an alternative homeland" for the Palestinian people.

Most Palestinian leaders express their firm belief that King Husayn is the first one who understands the danger that calls for "an alternative homeland" pose to Jordanians as well as Palestinians. Those people are saying, "That is why the Jordanian monarch zeroed in on the problem despite the bitterness he expressed in his address when he affirmed that the agreement, which was the foundation of the relationship between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, cannot be impaired." And here, as is the case in Palestinian leadership circles, the information indicates that the Jordanian monarch listened with considerable interest to the observations that were made by his aides and by some senior Jordanian officials about surprises that could happen any time. It is being said that Prince Hasan, the crown prince of Jordan, and al-Sharif Zayd ibn Shakir, the commander of the army, were chief among those officials. In addition, members of the Senate, such as former prime minister Ahmad 'Ubaydat, also spoke to the king.

The Next Step

If these are the considerations and circumstances that impelled Palestinian leaders to reach the conclusions they did reach in the statement they issued in response to the Jordanian step, then the question that must be answered is this: Where does the Resistance go from here after what happened? Where does the Resistance go after its declared presence in Jordan was diminished? That Palestinian statement was prepared by a committee chaired by Abu 'Ammar. Abu Iyad, Abu Mazin, Muhammad Milhim, 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad and 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya served on that committee.

The answer to that question comes in what is being said about organizational and administrative decrees. This time these decrees were made in earnest to get rid of the PLO's previous excesses and laxity and to revitalize those organizations and institutions that were beginning to wear out and show signs of old age. Consequently, a large number of the liberation army's "generals" is expected to be placed in the reserves or to retire. A new mode of mobilizing and organizing forces that is compatible with the given facts of the new stage will be adopted.

What leaders of the PLO fear most is that the use of "silencers" become characteristic of actions taken in the next stage. Voices calling for deadly covert actions against some Arab targets rather than Israeli targets are becoming louder. PLO leaders will try to curb such calls and to look for new ways and methods to step up the armed confrontation inside the occupied homeland.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PALESTINIAN SOURCES ON ISRAELI PLAN TO STRIKE JORDAN

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 19-25 Mar 86 pp 18-19

[Article by Salih Qallab: "Palestinian Sources in Tunisia Discuss Confidential Information about Israeli Plan To Strike Jordan"]

[Text] Among the Objectives of the plan: to force Palestinians in Lebanon and in the West Bank to emigrate to Jordan and to give up the occupied land.

The statement issued by the PLO in response to King Husayn's address, in which the king announced that coordination with Palestinian leaders would stop, implied a clear warning against the plan for "an alternative homeland." That plan would attempt to solve the question of Palestine in Jordan instead of through Jordan. In his address the Jordanian monarch had stopped short of discussing his country's national security. He did that again a few days later when he addressed the fourth conference of Arab parliamentarians. King Husayn indicated that Jordan's support for the occupied land must not conflict with its national security, which he said was an inseparable part of pan-Arab security.

These suggestions and implications stirred up a problem that is both old and new. That problem has to do with Israel's efforts ever since it was founded to expand toward the East Bank and to turn that part of the region into "a permanent homeland for the Palestinian people" so it could extinguish their dreams of returning to their homeland and establishing their independent state.

Since these Israeli ambitions are neither a new discovery, nor the topic of the hour, what is it that is new? Why is it that warnings are being issued at this time in particular by two specific parties? Do these warnings merely reflect fears and expectations, or is there confirmed information about Israel's scheming intentions?

About 3 years ago, in 1983 to be specific, a senior Chinese official gave a Palestinian official information which stated that the Zionist movement had convened four conferences. The first conference was held in Bangkok for Zionist representatives in the Far East; the second was held in South Africa for Zionist representatives in the Dark Continent; the third was held in Paris for the movement's representatives in Europe; and the fourth was held in Canada for its representatives in the United States and Latin America. These conferences

issued recommendations about the need to put into action the slogan of "an alternative homeland." They recommended that the United States be lobbied and that pressure be applied to it to achieve that objective.

In Egypt

There was a lengthy discussion recently between a principal official in Egypt and a senior Palestinian official about possible developments in light of the new situation between Jordan and the PLO. The Egyptian official, who is one of the decision makers in Cairo, talked about his country's fears of a military outbreak in the area. He mentioned there was information affirming that there were unusual Israeli military activities on the borders of Sinai, and he said that Israel was making preparations for some action. These were his exact words: "We may be affected by the effects of the outbreak of a new war in the Middle East."

When the recent Jordanian-Palestinian talks were in full swing, U.S. officials who had been staying in Amman made every effort to leak information warning about the Likud's return to power in Israel. They warned that Sharon's return to power at the head of that coalition would put the area once again on the brink of an explosion. In light of statements made by Israeli officials more than once, the Likud's and Sharon's return to power would provide an incentive for a repeat of the invasion of Lebanese territory.

Afterwards, some western organizations gave more than one organization in the area information about the anticipated invasion plan should the Likud come to power in Israel next October. They told them that the Israelis would cross the Jordan River and advance eastward because Jordanian territory was being used to launch operations against Israeli targets.

According to the script Israel's departure after that would be linked with political conditions all of which would serve the plan for "an alternate homeland." These conditions would create a situation like that which exists in Lebanon to overwhelm Jordanians and Palestinians and to distract all Arabs with a new crisis that would preoccupy them for scores of years. This part of the Arab homeland would be divided into small entities so that Israel's role in that area would be similar to that which Britain played years ago in the Commonwealth.

It seems--and this is not an assumption but rather confirmed information--that one of Israel's objectives is to force Palestinians in Lebanon and then Palestinians in the West Bank out of those areas and into east Jordan so as to create a demographic situation that could induce them to abandon the usurped homeland. Preparations could then be made in the occupied land to receive new waves of immigrant Jews.

It is known that the Jordanian monarch, the chairman of the PLO and other Arab leaders have been tirelessly warning recently about such a plan. In the period that followed Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the signing of the 17 May Agreement the need to force the Palestinian camps out of Lebanon and into Jordan was talked about openly.

The Military Plan

Regarding the anticipated military plan, the information indicates that authorized Syrian agencies are devoting much attention to the area that lies between the Jordanian borders and the occupied southern Golan Heights in the direction of al-Suwayda' in Jabal al-'Arab. These Syrian agencies believe that area will be the target of an Israeli attack to separate Jordan from Syria and prevent any Syrian supplies from getting through to support Jordanian forces.

The belief prevails that the second attack will come across the central valley in a line parallel to al-Salt and advance in the direction of the capital, Amman. The third line of attack will be across the southern valleys parallel to al-Karak, in the direction of the Desert Highway between south Jordan and the capital. It is believed that the goal of attacking that line is to apply military and political pressure to the area of the Gulf.

One notices here that while U.S. representatives traveling in the area were warning of such an attack, the United States tried to put pressure on the Jordanian government by freezing the weapons deal for Jordan. That was the deal that was estimated to be worth about 1.5 billion dollars. It is being said that carrying out that Israeli attack depends on the outcome of the Gulf War. Israel would carry out its attack in both cases. It would attack if the Iraqi army wins under the pretext of opposing an Arab party that proved its existence in the most violent war of modern history. Israel would also attack if Iranian troops advance from their present positions so as to intercept a constant danger which is advancing from the east and supported by large numbers of people.

A few days ago an Israeli newspaper revealed information in three related and consecutive articles about the possibility that a new war could break out. The newspaper revealed that three attempts had been made to carry out the new aggression. The first attempt was made after an Israeli intelligence group was killed in Larnaca by Palestinian guerillas. But that attempt was replaced by the well-known raid on Tunisia which was carried out on the advice of the Americans. The second attempt was made after the hijacking of the vessel, Achille Lauro. However, an Israeli opinion which stated that priority should be given to the physical elimination of Palestinian leaders prevailed. Israelis who subscribed to that opinion wanted to benefit from the western anti-PLO campaign that was being waged to oppose terrorist operations.

The third attempt was made when Israeli fighters hijacked a Libyan airplane while it was flying in Cyprian air space and forced it to land in a military airport in north occupied Palestine. Israel believed that Syria's reaction would be immediate and that it would constitute sufficient grounds for a new attack whose primary target would be Jordan. Consonant with what that newspaper mentioned, international organizations who are familiar with Israeli policy are affirming that if current conditions in the Middle East continue on the same course, the anticipated strike will be made in the remaining months of this year. The strike will be made if elections are held in Israel to prevent the Likud from assuming the reins of power again or if Shimon Peres gives in and yields power to his partners in this government which has two prime ministers.

A Difference in Points of View

It seems that the current contradiction in points of view between Jordan and the PLO is due essentially to the lack of agreement on the method and manner of opposing the plan for "an alternate homeland" and not to a lack of agreement on the methods and means of regaining the West Bank. In this regard the information leads us to conclude that the Jordanian monarch was advised by the British more than once to reach out promptly to Peres to help him accomplish even some limited progress toward a solution of the Middle East crisis so as to keep the Likud from coming back to power. The British think that that is the only way to keep the haunting idea of "an alternate homeland" at bay. That idea is being promoted by Gen Ariel Sharon, the man of the next stage. Sharon is anxious to cross the Jordan River to the east just as he crossed the Litani River to the north. He is anxious to have his armies march into a new Arab capital just as they marched into the capital of Lebanon.

The substance of the Jordanian proposals contained in King Husayn's address makes it clear that Jordan is taking the subject of "an alternate homeland" and Israel's threats very seriously. Accordingly, it is concentrating on having Washington refrain from adopting that Israeli idea and on persuading it to curb the ambitions of the generals of the Israeli army.

It is certain that King Husayn, who is considered one of the world's few sophisticated politicians, knows quite well what it means for the United States to sacrifice a man like the Shah of Iran and a man like Marcos when the choice is one between its own interests and appeasing Reza Pahlavi or the president of the Philippines. King Husayn understands what is involved when the United States has to choose between its own interests and those of any other person in the world.

In return, the Palestinian point of view is one which states that undermining the PLO or keeping it out of the picture is what is opening the door to the plan for "an alternate homeland." The PLO's strength and cohesiveness will enable it to resist that plan and will prevent the emergence of a new Palestinian situation in which that plan could be accepted under the pressure of a established fact.

The PLO is also affirming that the existing solidarity between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples is the strongest weapon for opposing the plan for "an alternate homeland." The PLO admits that King Husayn is doing everything he can to prevent any rift in relations between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples.

If the British reported the aforementioned information to King Husayn, the Palestinians received information from more than one country indicating that the United States is actually promoting the plan for "an alternate homeland." There is an American movement headed by George Shultz that wants to achieve that plan which would then strengthen his position in the coming elections. All that would be done under the banner of rearranging conditions in the Middle East, and these rearrangements would be similar to what happened and is happening in a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries.

American Pressures

Such a tendency emerged in the United States on the eve of the well-known September events in Jordan in 1970, after one Palestinian organization hijacked a number of civilian airplanes, forced them to land in a desert airport near the Jordanian-Iraqi border and then blew them up. That airport had been used 30 years earlier by British forces. At that time that tendency justified what it was advocating by saying that "it was not reasonable to insist on recognizing a state that did not control its own territory and could not preserve its national sovereignty."

A senior Arab politician relates that King Husayn told him that Jordan suffered from considerable American pressure during that period. That pressure went so far as to make U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan monthly. In the past Jordan received that aid annually and seasonally.

To pinpoint the Palestinian point of view with regard to the development of relations with Jordan and the possibilities such a development would entail, reference must be made to the fact that Palestinian leaders paused at length to consider the motives that induced Jordanian radio and television to broadcast the Palestinian response to the Jordanian monarch's address in its entirety. Not a single word or paragraph was deleted.

Two opinions emerged in that regard. One stated that King Husayn considered the statement's tone calm and fostering a resumption of the dialogue. That opinion states that what the Jordanian media did was tantamount to taking a step to meet the Palestinians halfway. The other opinion states that what was intended was to put the entire matter in front of the Palestinian people and to tell them that this is what the PLO has to offer: nothing but sweet talk.

Al-Asad's Visit

Still a third opinion stated that King Husayn wanted to keep the lines of communication with Palestinian leaders open. He did not want to settle the matter one way or another until after Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad visits Amman. According to U.S. information reported to the PLO by an Arab country, that visit was scheduled to take place either immediately after the 8th of March celebrations in Syria or around the 19th of that month.

Since the subject of the anticipated Israeli military attack is related basically to the directions in which Palestinian-Jordanian relations are developing, reference must be made to the fact that recent Palestinian meetings, which were held after the statement in response to King Husayn's address was issued, reviewed the possibilities of future Jordanian activities and reached the following conclusions:

1. Everything that happened was to be retracted, and the dialogue was to be resumed to comply with the Palestinian request which was made in Abu 'Ammar's statement affirming his commitment to the Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement.
2. Accepting the ultimate outcome of the status quo and dealing with the consequences of autonomy in case Shimon Peres does carry out his promise, which he declared in front of the UN General Assembly in its recent session.

3. Overlooking the PLO and establishing a formula for a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation outside the framework of the PLO to negotiate with the United States and join the negotiations directly or indirectly in an international conference or a UN supervised conference.

4. Or achieving a formula with Syria sponsored by some Arab countries in which Palestinian participation would not involve the PLO or would involve parties that oppose present Palestinian leaders.

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CSO: 4404/260

AFGHANISTAN

DISGUISED MUJAHIDIN CAPTURE SOVIET PARATROOPERS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 26 Feb 86 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Feb 25 (Dispatches)--Afghan Mujahideen disguised as police officers captured 30 Soviet paratroopers dropped in eastern Afghanistan, western diplomats said Tuesday.

Soviet and Afghan government troops were sent to free the soldiers, triggering scattered battles, but the fate of the Soviets was not known, the diplomats said.

The diplomats said the incident occurred on Feb 18 near Sarobi, about 40 miles (65 km) east of the Afghan capital of Kabul.

"Mujahideen posing as policemen captured 30 paratroopers," who were dropped near the town, said one of two diplomats who briefed reporters on condition they not be named.

The other diplomat said the paratroopers were Russians.

"Some scattered battles took place (when Soviet and Afghan troops tried to free them) but the Mujahideen managed to elude them," said one diplomat.

The fate of the paratroopers was not known.

The reporters could be independently verified, as western reports rarely have been allowed into Afghanistan since the Soviets invaded in December 1979 and installed Babrak Karmal as president [sentence as published]. About 115,000 Soviet troops are currently based there fighting the Muslim freedom fighters.

Military Convoy Ambushed

In a separate incident on Feb 6, the Mujahideen ambushed a convoy of Afghan military vehicles near the town of Nahrin, about 100 miles (160 km) north of Kabul, the diplomats said.

One diplomat said 100 Afghan government troops and seven officers were killed in the attack.

In Kabul, several military jets were seen on Feb 24 bombing the hill just north of the airport.

Two days earlier a Soviet military helicopter exploded in the air near the customs house in eastern Kabul, the diplomats said.

Four Soviets on board were killed, the diplomats said.

One said the crash also killed six Afghans on the ground.

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AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

ECONOMIC FIGURES ANNOUNCED--Gross national product (GNP) reached Af 153,000 million (\$3,000 million) in 1985. It fell during the first two years after the Soviet intervention and took a further three years to reach its pre-1979 level of Af 142,700 million (\$2,800 million), says central planning organisation head Sarwar Mangal. Annual inflation has remained at 20 percent for the past five years; per capital income has risen by less than 2 percent at constant prices from its 1978 level of \$130 a year, says Commerce Minister Mohammad Khan Jalalar. Exports for 1984 fell to \$660 million from the previous year's \$670 million; this figure was still more than double the 1978 level of \$321 million. Imports in 1984 rose to \$964 million from \$820 million. State-run MILLIE BUS is to buy 400 buses made by India's TATA. The joint Afghan-Soviet transport company AFSOTR -- set up in 1976 -- is expanding. Between May-December 1985, it carried more than 23,000 tonnes of goods -- double its target -- in 650 container trucks. Kabul's private traders import two-thirds of their consumer goods through the Soviet Union. [Text] [London MEED/MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST in English 8 Feb 86 p 3]
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CSO: 4600/258

INDIA

TEXT OF NOTE TO RAJIV ON 'DECLINE' OF CONGRESS-I

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Mar 86 p 8

[Article by Madhavsinh Solanki]

[Text] We reproduce below the text of the former Gujarat chief minister, Mr. Madhavsinh Solanki's note to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi because it, in our view, represents the sentiments of a large number of Congressmen at various levels. Mr. Solanki is a controversial person and his note to Mr. Gandhi cannot be regarded as a wholly disinterested assessment. But it is an important document and merits publication in full. — *Editor.*

WHILE making a realistic assessment of the present situation let us have a look at the hard facts:

The mass enthusiasm and euphoria of early 1985 is on gradual wane; scepticism and nagging doubts about the intentions and capabilities of the ruling party are being increasingly expressed amongst common people; and a sense of disillusionment is spreading fast amongst weaker sections, peasants, workers and even middle class.

Rightly or wrongly, the impression is gaining ground that the policies of the government are leaning more toward pro-rich and the private corporate sector is the only major concern of the government. The pious declarations and oft-repeated brave new-world ideas, unaccompanied by any concrete grass-root level action, are proving counter-productive and the very credibility of the government is being increasingly questioned by urban middle class and intelligentsia.

The 1985 Union budget, liberalisation of imports, encouragement to U-sector consumer industries, substantial pre-budget hikes in the rates of petroleum products, coal, fertilisers, electricity and state transport, rising retail prices of essential

consumer goods, and continued tirade against public sector are commonly cited as evidence of the pro-rich bias of the state dispensation.

The frequent reshuffle of the Union cabinet, chief ministers, party executives and bureaucratic slots have generated a sense of instability and people perceive it as a situation of flux and continuing adhocism in the decision-making process at the highest level. As the 'replacements' have not often proved better than the oustee the very wisdom of change-mechanism is now increasingly questioned.

The ugly scenes at the Nagpur session of Youth Congress, centenary celebrations fiasco at Bombay, style and activities of "new" leaders at different levels and increasing gap between the old and new Congress workers on the one hand and on the other the party support-base and safari-clad elite leadership are creating vibrations which may one day rock the party, and the very "identity" of the century-old organisation may be lost.

The rejection of untested transplants by the bodypolity may create serious consequences for the long-term health of the party.

The poll results during last assembly elections and subsequently in Punjab and Assam and then in the

recent by-elections is a continuous down the hill march since the high water-mark of December, 1984, Lok Sabha performance.

It is a clear reflection of the manifest reactions of the party's support base and common people, on the basis of their perception of the ruling party during last one year.

Growing Alienation

The growing alienation of minority communities, backward classes and rural masses is discernible in the poll results of last one year and the trend is likely to gather further momentum if perception of the people is not changed in favour of the ruling party.

The change in the tone and perception of the press is yet another indication of the growing disenchantment of the common man with the ruling party. Even friendly press is not-so-friendly now and their evaluation of the government is increasingly critical. The 'erosion' in the image of the party seems to be fast and popularity of the government is slowly but surely taking a dip.

The above described trend is therefore required to be arrested and reversed if we want to retrieve 1984 high popularity mark and then to march ahead towards the goal of 21st century under the leadership of our Prime Minister. It is, therefore, a time for serious introspection and dispassionate review of the developments of last about 15 months of the present rule. The opposition is just waiting in the wings and every wrong step of the ruling party will give new life and vigour to the forces which are today out to destabilise and recapture the power, first at the state level and finally at the national level. In some ways, the scenario is reminiscent of 1966-67 days.

Taking an overall macro-view of the present day nation and changing mood of the people, following are some suggestions in the critical areas;

1. Demonstrative pro-poor measures giving direct and immediate benefits to downtrodden, backward and weaker sections of the society, especially in rural and semi-urban areas.

Subsidised rations, drinking water, medicare and mid-day meals to children could be some of such measures.

'Subsidy' should not be construed always as 'economic drain', it is in fact an equitable compensation to

the unorganised sector for the fall in the value of money vis-a-vis organised sector who are compensated in terms of tax-relief, dearness allowance and increased prices of their products.

2. Priority to the production of mass consumption goods at cheap rates through standardisation, tax concessions, cheap credit and marketing facilities. NTC Mills can play a vital role in this area.

3. Curb on conspicuous consumption vulgar display of wealth through taxation, production policy planning and physical controls.

4. Frontal attack on tax evasion, smuggling and foreign exchange violations. These economic offences should be treated like criminal offence of 'cheating' and there should be mandatory provision of rigorous minimum imprisonment of five years and above for such offenders. The economic penalties are not effective in this area.

Substantial Incentives

5. Substantial incentives for 'savings' and investment in priority and core sector like housing, power generation R&D, communications and transport.

1. Cosmetic and peripheral administrative reforms will not succeed in bringing any meaningful change. The very system and culture of bureaucracy require an institutional overhaul;

(a) The excessive job-security of permanent service has to be replaced by the fair security of 'tenure jobs';

(b) 'Merit' system of promotions must replace the 'seniority' system of career advancement for services;

(c) Vertical and horizontal movement of files to avoid responsibility and decision making must be ruthlessly stopped and each matter must be decided at one level only to fix responsibility and improve quality of disposal, and

(d) Lateral entry into services and greater mobility between desk jobs and field jobs.

Restrictions on the trade union rights of the government servants. In any case, trade unions/associations cannot be permitted in police, para-military forces and higher services.

The administrative reforms must travel to the grassroot level where common people come into contact with government. Efficiency at the top level in the Union government only will not be enough to serve the masses. The real rot is at the district and local self-government level.

An overall 10% to 20% cut in non-productive expenditure of the government through reallocation of resources and work and through economy in the wasteful expenditure.

Complete autonomy for the public sector functioning so as to match authority with responsibility. The government should only lay down targets and monitor their performance periodically. Rest must be left to the man-on-the-job.

Leadership must 'grow' and workers must gradually progress from panchayat to assembly and then to parliament. It will maintain their grass-root level contacts and alienation between the people and party will be checkmated.

PCC, DCC and TCC must have 'whole-timers' to properly run the party offices and to give a content to party organisation. The party must have active association with pro-

fessionals and ideologues including economists, social scientists and political analysts. They must provide a 'think-tank' right up to the district level.

The party should have its own daily newspapers and periodicals in English as well as in vernacular languages.

Continuity and stability must be provided to the functioning of the party as well as of the government.

Lastly, steps be taken to resolve the 'crisis of confidence' amongst party leaders and workers. The trend towards character assassination, motivated and inspired rumour-mongering and levelling of baseless allegations must be ruthlessly reversed as a first necessary step towards cohesive functioning of the party. These would mean some structural arrangement of the highest level also.

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CSO: 4600/1552

INDIA

REPORTAGE ON GOVERNMENT CRISIS IN JAMMU, KASHMIR

Governor's Rule Imposed

Madras THE HINDU in English 8 Mar 86 p 1

[Article by G.K. Reddy]

[Text] NEW DELHI, March 7.

The Jammu and Kashmir Governor, Mr. Jagmohan, today invoked Section 92 of the State Constitution to impose his rule in the State with the concurrence of the Centre, after the State Congress (I) Legislature Party last night withdrew support to the G. M. Shah Government.

The 19-month old Government, which was installed in office with Congress (I) support, was dismissed before the issue of the Governor's proclamation.

The Union Cabinet held a brief meeting, soon after receipt of the Governor's report, to approve the imposition of Governor's rule. In the absence of the Prime Minister, the second senior-most Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, presided over the meeting to complete this formality.

In suspended animation

The Assembly is being kept in suspended animation to enable Mr. Jagmohan to explore the possibilities of forming an alternative Government within the six-month time-limit set by the State Constitution. If the Centre does not want fresh elections in the prevailing communal atmosphere.

The first task of the State administration under Governor's rule would be to maintain law and order, restore communal amity and prepare the ground for the revival of popular government under more stable political conditions. The Kashmir Valley, which was rocked by unprecedented communal violence in the last 10 days, is still in a highly disturbed condition. However, enough police reinforcements have been

flooded in to restore the confidence of the minority community which suffered in the senseless orgy of loot, arson and intimidation.

Desperate attempt

The dismissed Chief Minister, who fell from grace because of his inability or reluctance to deal firmly with the secessionist and fundamentalist elements in the Kashmir Valley, made a desperate last-minute attempt to salvage his tottering position by offering to merge his breakaway party with the parent National Conference, and urge the Governor to invite Dr. Farooq Abdullah to form a new Government. But this ploy did not work and Mr. Shah was dismissed ignominiously when he started dragging his feet to delay the submission of the resignation.

But the Governor did not crown himself with glory either. He was the main engineer of Dr. Abdullah's ouster in 1984 with the help of the Congress (I) by staging what came to be widely criticised as a constitutional coup. Now he was the driving force once again in the campaign for the dismissal of the discredited G. M. Shah Government.

At one stage of the present crisis in Kashmir, some experts at the Centre felt the State needed a longer spell of Governor's rule than permissible under the State Constitution. So the idea of imposing President's rule rather than Governor's rule was mooted at the highest level, but the Prime Minister and his advisers felt this was no time to start another controversy by over-riding past practice.

The Centre also decided in favour of Governor's rule since the intention is to put back Dr. Abdullah in power with Congress (I) support, if he is prepared to stand up to the communal forces in the State. The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, is reported to have appreciated his helpful role in controlling the latest communal violence, while Mr. G. M. Shah failed lamentably in his duty to deal sternly with pro-Pakistan ele-

ments on the rampage.

The Union Home Ministry and other agencies of the Central Government will assist the State administration during Governor's rule in weeding out the many undesirable elements that have managed to get into government service over the years with political patronage. Mr. Jagmohan is being asked to take strong action against known secessionist groups and other communal forces behind the latest violence.

President's concurrence

PTI, UNI report:

The notice of dismissal was given to Mr. Shah in dramatic circumstances. As he and his colleagues alighted from the plane in Jammu, Mr. Shah was handed a letter from the Governor asking him to resign as he had lost majority in the Assembly.

Mr. Shah, who was in Delhi this morning left for Jammu as soon as he heard that the Governor was seeking his resignation.

The action taken today by the Governor, Mr. Jagmohan, under Section 92 of the State Constitution has the concurrence of the President.

Announcing Mr. Shah's "dismissal" at the Raj Bhavan, Mr. Jagmohan told reporters that it

was immaterial whether Mr. Shah tendered the resignation or not.

He said that he had before hand made up his mind to dismiss Mr. Shah after he had satisfied himself that a situation had risen that the former Chief Minister could not carry out the functions of the Government in accordance with the provisions of the State Constitution.

Assuming all the functions of the Government to himself, the Governor, in his proclamation, said that he was suspending the operation of Section 35 to 41 of the State Constitution and a portion of the Section 43 relating to allocation of business of Government among Ministers.

Mr. Jagmohan also announced suspension of 22 other Sections of the State Constitution, inclusive of Section 137 relating to laying of a report with a memorandum before the State Legislature.

The letter, announcing the Congress(I)'s withdrawal of support was handed over to Mr. Jagmohan by the Congress(I) Legislature party chief, Moulvi Iftikhar Hussein Ansari around 2 a.m. today.

The party had "withdrawn support" since the Shah Government had 'failed to give a better administration to the people'.

Legal Provisions Explained

Madras THE HINDU in English 7 Mar 86 p 1

[Article by G.K. Reddy]

[Excerpts] New Delhi, March 6.

Top functionaries of the Government dealing with Kashmir developments were unaware till the other day that, contrary to general belief, the Centre had the power to impose President's rule in the State under Article 356 of the Constitution.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, which is an integral part of the Indian Union, has been permitted to have its own Constitution which empowers the Governor to take over the administration for a period of six months, subject to the concurrence of the President.

The Governor can exercise this power, under Section 92 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution, acting on his own discretion without seeking the advice of his Council of Ministers, if he is satisfied that the administration of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this State Constitution. All that he has to do is to ensure through prior consultations with the Centre that his decision would be endorsed by it.

In the case of the other States of the Indian Union, the Governor must first make such a recommendation to the President, who will seek the Prime Minister's advice. After the Central Cabinet has considered the Governor's recommendation and advised the President to act on it, the necessary notification under Article 356 is issued authorising the Governor to assume charge of

the administration.

The Central leaders who have been examining various alternatives open to them in coping with the communal upsurge in Kashmir were somewhat inhibited in deciding upon the course of action they should take by imagining that, if they opted for Governor's rule, then they should be prepared to usher in a new Ministry or go in for fresh elections, within the six-month period stipulated in the State Constitution.

But they have now realised that Article 356 in its original form had been extended to Jammu and Kashmir through a notification issued on December 31, 1964, with the concurrence of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. It means that, if it does not want the Governor to impose his rule, the Centre can act on his recommendations and place the State under President's rule up to a period of three years, provided the approval of Parliament is obtained every six months for its extension.

It is equally significant that the Janata Government which amended Article 356 to limit President's rule to a maximum of one year, except when an Emergency was in operation, did not take steps to apply this amendment to Jammu and Kashmir with the concurrence of the State Government. The result is that this Article in its original form continues to apply in toto to Jammu and Kashmir even after the famous 42nd amendment.

Comment by Arjun Singh

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 8 Mar 86 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, March 7: Mr L. K. Advani was today declared elected unanimously as president of the Bharatiya Janata Party, after the incumbent, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, remained adamant on not continuing in office. Today was the last date for filing nominations for the party election.

Mr Advani's was the lone name left after Mr Vajpayee informed the returning officer, Mr Jagannath Rao Joshi, that the proposal by members of the

party electoral college favouring his nomination did not have his consent. He requested the returning officer to treat his letter as withdrawal of his nomination.

Mr Advani's succession as president is being considered in party circles as an effort to "revitalise the party.

Significantly, the party vice-president, Mrs Vijay Raje Scindia, who was at one time considered as a probable successor of Mr Vajpayee, was among those who proposed Mr Advani.

Abdullah Remarks, Other Developments

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 9 Mar 86 p 1

[Text] Jammu, March 8 (UNI, PTI): The former Jammu and Kashmir chief minister, Dr Farooq Abdullah, announced today that he will not stake his claim for forming the government and said he will think of forming it only after fresh elections are held to the state Assembly.

"I do not believe in horse trading but clean politics. I will think of forming the government after fresh elections are held to the state Assembly," Mr Abdullah told UNI over telephone from Srinagar.

He said he and his party would extend full cooperation to the governor, Mr Jagmohan, in restoring peace and communal amity in the state.

The dismissed Jammu and Kashmir chief minister, Mr G.M. Shah, said he had requested Dr Farooq Abdullah to stake his claim for forming a new government in the state, assuming his party's (National Conference-Khaleda) unconditional support.

Merger move welcomed

Prominent workers of the National Conference(K) welcomed Mr G.M. Shah's decision to merge the party with the National Conference(F).

In a resolution adopted at a meeting under the chairmanship of the provincial party chief, Mr Rashid Shah, the NC(K) pledged to fight all those opposing the state's autonomy. It criticised the withdrawal of support by the Congress(I) legislature party leader, Moulvi Iftikhar Hussain Ansari, to the Shah ministry. It said the charges levelled by Mr Ansari in his letter to the governor were "baseless."

However, four senior ministers of the dissolved Jammu and Kashmir council of ministers have dismissed

Mr G.M. Shah's claim that he had the support of all his colleagues in dissolving and merging the NC(K) with the National Conference led by Dr Farooq Abdullah.

The Election Commission has cancelled the biennial elections to the Rajya Sabha seat and a number of seats to the state Legislative Council scheduled for March 27.

Police reshuffle

Our Correspondent in Srinagar reports: The governor today ordered the transfer and reposting of several top police and civil officials.

The divisional commissioner, Mr Ghulam Qadir Lone, has been replaced by Mr Hamidullah Khan and the DIG, Kashmir range, Mr S.S. Ali has been replaced by Mr A.M. Watali.

Mr A.R. Nanda, additional inspector-general, police personnel, has been posted as IGP, home guards and civil defence, in place of Mr Amar Kapoor who has been posted as additional IGP(CID). Other senior police officers who have been transferred "in the interest of administration" are Mr M.A. Numani, DIG (CID) and Mr S.S. Ali. They have been posted as DIG, personnel, police headquarters and DIG, armed police, respectively.

Many more transfers and postings are expected within the next few days, reliable sources said. They also said Mr Jagmohan might recall some top officials who were sent back to their parent departments outside the state.

Mr Jagmohan has already sent a telegram to the former principal secretary to Dr Farooq Abdullah, Mr Mehmood-ur-Rehman, to report to him immediately. Mr Rehman is now on an official trip to Shimla.

Independent Group Formed

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 10 Mar 86 p 1

[Text]

JAMMU, March 9 (UNI):

THE National Conference (Khaleda) today received a major setback when 14 of the 19 cabinet ministers of the dismissed G. M. Shah ministry decided to form their independent group.

After a party meeting here, the former information minister, Mr. Rafiq Hussain Khan said that since the National Conference (K) had decided to merge with the National Conference (Farooq) on Friday, it seized to exist.

He said: "We decided to form an independent group" at the meeting.

Meanwhile, the NC(K) decided to withdraw its offer of merger with the NC(F).

After a party meeting here, the NC(K) chief Begum Khaleda Shah said the offer of merger had been withdrawn in view of the statements made by the leadership of Dr. Farooq Abdullah's party.

She said the assembly members of her party had made the offer of merger and unconditional support to Dr. Abdullah on Friday but "in view of his (Dr. Abdullah's) indifferent attitude, the same has been withdrawn".

Referring to the name of the new group Mr. Khan said: "In view of the Anti-defection Act of the state, we are seeking legal opinion about the name of our group which would be decided by tomorrow."

According to Mr. Khan, the former cabinet ministers who attended today's meeting are: Mr. Gurbachan Kumari Arana; Mr. Hakim Mohammed Yassen, Mr. Dillawar Mir, Mr. Ghulam Hussain Mir, Hemlata Wakhloo, Mr. Jagjivan Lal, Mr. Ali Mohd Naik, Mr. Sheikh Abdul Jabbar, Mr. Munshi Habib Ullah, Tali B. Hussain, Mr. Khalil Johar, Dr. Mehboob Beg and Sona Ullah Dar.

PTI adds: The district magistrate, Jammu, today ordered further relaxation of the curfew, which will now remain in force in the city from 12 midnight to 5 a.m.

He has also ordered that all colleges closed indefinitely following clashes between police and students on Thursday last should be reopened tomorrow.

However, restrictions in force in the city under section 144 Cr.P.C., banning meetings and assembly of more than five persons shall continue, the order said.

Meanwhile, the state budget for 1986-87 would be passed before March 31 the chief secretary, Mr. K. Takkar said here.

Under the constitution, the budget is not required to be presented for approval in the legislature during the governor's rule in the state.

FAROOQ FOR POLL IN AUG.

The governor is empowered to approve the budget as he enjoys all executive and legislative powers when the legislature is suspended.

Srinagar, (UNI): Dr. Farooq Abdullah on Sunday, summoned an "extra ordinary" meeting of the National Conference (Farooq) working committee here on Monday, to decide on a merger with the party's faction led by his sister Begum Khaleda Shah.

Asked if he would allow the merger between the two factions, Dr. Abdullah said it was for the working committee to decide.

In his absence, the working committee will be held under the chairmanship of his mother Begum Abdullah, M.P., Dr. Abdullah said before leaving for Delhi.

Dr. Farooq Abdullah expressed himself in favour of assembly elections in the state in August-September. He said the governor's rule should continue in the state for the time being.

In reply to a question, Dr. Abdullah said the governor, Mr. Jagmohan "is a good administrator and will remove the 'mess' created by the previous government."

On steps being taken to restore confidence among the minorities, Dr. Abdullah said the Centre had taken the first step of removing the ministry of "defectors".

PEACE COMMITTEES

This step will not only restore the confidence among the "minority community, but as well among the majority," Dr. Abdullah observed.

He said peace committees had been set up for the purpose and other measures were in the offing to restore confidence among the minorities.

The awami action committee chief, Mirwaiz Moulvi Farooq, a political ally of Dr. Abdullah also met the governor separately.

The Mirwaiz urged the governor to dissolve the state assembly and pave the way for fresh elections.

The Panthers Party chief, Mr. Bhim Singh also demanded immediate dis-

solution of the assembly and holding of fresh elections in the state.

Addressing a press conference here, he welcomed the imposition of governor's rule in the state.

PTI adds: The state governor, Mr. Jagmohan disagreed with the idea of appointing a probe body to go into the recent disturbances in parts of the state.

Inquiry commissions, he told prominent citizens at a meeting here, always

prove to be a waste of time, and no fruitful results could be achieved from them.

New Delhi (PTI): Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, welcomed the Congress's withdrawal of support to the Jammu and Kashmir government leading to the resignation of the chief minister, Mr. G. M. Shah, and called for an enquiry into reports of violence and desecration of places of worship.

Interview With Farooq Abdullah

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 11 Mar 86 p 7

[Interview by Yusuf Jameel, Srinagar with Dr Farooq Abdullah, president of the National Conference, date and place unknown]

[Text]

Q: Why have you refused to accept the chief ministership when you had the opportunity?

A: The reason for my refusing to form a new government is that my battle is not for the chair but it is for the principles which I hold very dear. And you know no compromises are made where principles are involved.

Q: Is it not a fact that it would have been very difficult for you to control things at this juncture and to escape this you decided not to avail of the opportunity to form a government?

A: Yes, I agree with you that the situation prevailing in the state is very critical. Particularly, the recent communal disturbances and the subsequent short-sighted steps by the Shah government have shattered the people's confidence. Especially, the minority community is depressed. Had I reoccupied the chair it would have been nothing but adorning my head with a crown of full thorns. But believe me, that is not the basic reason for my decision. I had been demanding ever since Shah came to power in the summer of 1984, that democracy should be restored in the state at all costs. The imposition of governor's rule is the first step towards achieving the goal.

Q: How can this goal be achieved fully?

A: Fresh elections should be held to the state Assembly—let the people decide who should rule the state. As far as

I am concerned, I will never accept power unless the people choose me.

Q: Do you not think that your refusal is a political mistake? Some people think that the Congress(I) now has enough time for horse-trading because the governor has not dissolved the Assembly but kept it in suspended animation?

A: I am sure that elections will be held and that the governor will not allow any kind of horse-trading. But if the Congress(I) tries and succeeds in forming a government after adopting such tactics, it ought to face the same fate as Shah did.

Q: When do you feel fresh elections should be held?

A: I think August or September is the right time for elections. This is because this year's tourist season will start very soon and, as you are aware, it lasts upto mid-September. In recent years, we had very poor tourists seasons, first because of the Punjab violence and then the crisis within Jammu and Kashmir. We cannot afford yet another poor season. I have already requested the governor to ensure that the tourist season this summer is made a success. And I am confident he is capable of doing this.

Q: What steps should be initiated to revamp the tourist industry in Kashmir?

A: The central government should first introduce concessions to tourists visiting Kash-

mir by air or by rail. Besides, Srinagar airport should be declared an international airport capable of handling international tourist traffic, especially from the countries of the far East and West Asia.

Q: Don't you think that will pose a threat to the security of a sensitive state like Jammu and Kashmir?

A: We have enough sources and agencies there to check things which can prove harmful to the security and integrity of the country. But don't you think such things can take place in Delhi, Madras and Calcutta also? If some undesirable person wants to come to Kashmir he can come by road also unless he is stopped.

Q: It is believed in some circles that Mr Shah's move to merge his National Conference with your party was pre-planned?

A: No it was not. Had it been so and had I been interested in power then I could claim to form a government on my own. Even after Shah's decision I could still tell the governor that yes, I am interested in forming a government.

Q: Are you taking Mr Shah and his colleagues back in the party?

A: This will be decided by the party working committee which will probably meet tomorrow. I want every member to be present to take up this crucial issue.

Q: Should Mr Shah and his colleagues be allowed to rejoin the party? What is your personal opinion?

A: No, I do not want to give any personal opinion. If I do so then my party working committee members will ask me why they have been invited to decide. Can't you wait for a few days?

Q: Is it a fact that your sister Begum Khalida Shah had written to you that she and her partymen should be allowed to join the party?

A: Yes, I received a letter from her on Saturday and I will place this letter before the working committee.

Q: What are the contents of her letter?

A: It will not be proper to disclose them now. But one thing I can tell you is, she has

requested that her party's decision should be accepted.

Q: When you last met Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Delhi, did he tell you that his party was going to withdraw its support to the G.M. Shah ministry?

A: Well, we discussed the issues concerning the state and the nation as a whole. Our meeting was very cordial. I told him that democracy should be restored in the state before it was too late.

Q: How do you view the Prime Minister's move?

A: It was long due. Thank God it has come ultimately—it is better late than never. Rajiv Gandhi has taken a bold decision. Why not give him credit for it?

Q: Will your party have an electoral understanding with the Congress(I)?

A: It is a question of time. Let us see how things develop. But let me clear one thing. The final arbiters of the state are its people and they alone can decide what I or any other party or leader should do.

Q: What is the main task before the governor?

A: As I said, the state is at a crucial stage. The recent communal disturbances have shattered the confidence of the minority community. He has to restore that confidence first. The misrule of the Shah government has also landed the state in an economic crisis. The administration has been affected by political interference. Corruption is there. He has to make efforts to set things right, and above all the people's confidence in democracy has to be restored. It is for him to decide what is needed and who should be where.

Q: How are your relations with your allies—Mirwaiz Farooq, Abdul Gani Lone and Bhim Singh? It is said that Mr Lone is not pleased with some of your recent moves such as your developing a soft corner for the Congress(I).

A: Our relations are very cordial. I have been meeting them to discuss issues. They are my good friends as well and I hope in future too our relations will remain as they are today. At present, we all have to help the governor in his efforts to restore democracy in the state fully!

INDIA

NEW GROUP FORMED IN KASHMIR, OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Calcutta THE STATEMAN in English 12 Mar 86 p 1

[Text] Jammu, March 11--Supporters of the deposed Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Mr G. M. Shah, today formed themselves into a separate group in the State Assembly electing Mr Ali Mohammad Naik their leader, report UNI and PTI.

Dr Farooq Abdullah today hoped that elections in his State would take place between August and September. Talking to reporters in Bombay, he said he could not join hands with the elements "who looted the State in all respects and destroyed its communal harmony".

Dr Abdullah, who arrived in Bombay last night in connection with his brother's medical check-up, addressed Opposition legislators at the Council Hall and apprised them of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

Elaborating his stand on fresh elections, Dr Abdullah said "people are masters, let them decide the party which they want in power". He expressed the hope that the Centre would hold elections once peace was restored and added that Governor's rule was the best in the existing situation.

Dr Abdullah said the Shah Government had destroyed communal harmony in the State. "It will take years to rebuild it," he said at the Press conference where the Congress (S) president, Mr Sharad Pawar, was present.

Dr Abdullah advocated "secular politics" for the country's unity and integrity.

Mr D.D. Thakur, the Deputy Chief Minister in the dissolved Ministry of Mr Shah, has decided to quit politics. According to sources close to Mr Thakur, who left for New Delhi yesterday, he will resume practice as a Supreme Court lawyer. Before joining Sheikh Abdullah's Ministry as a senior member in March 1975, Mr Thakur was a judge of the State High Court.

The State Governor, Mr Jagmohan, today appointed Mr Mahmoodul-Rehman, a senior officer of the State's IAS cadre, Commissioner for Planning and Development.

Mr Rehman, who was Principal Secretary to the former Chief Minister, Dr Abdullah, had been shifted from the Secretariat by Mr Shah on the very day he assumed as Chief Minister 20 months ago, and appointed managing director of J and K Industries Limited, a State Government undertaking.

The Governor has asked Mr Ashok Kumar, IAS, on deputation to the Government of India, to join as chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir Bank.

Mr Jagmohan abolished six out of 24 posts of secretaries to effect economy and rationalize administrative machinery.

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CSO: 4600/1553

INDIA

UK REPORTED UNHAPPY WITH INDIAN HIGH COMMISSION

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 8 Mar 86 p 7

[Article by Ashis Ray]

[Text] London, March 7: The British foreign office is furious at the Indian high commission here for allegedly supplying false and misleading information to section of the Indian press, some to the detriment of the United Kingdom.

A senior official of the foreign ministry telephoned this correspondent yesterday to say: "I wish some of your colleagues would check their facts before filing stories." He also levelled an accusation against the Indian Mission of not doing its homework before briefing journalists.

Whitehall is particularly upset about a report in Indian papers that nine asylum seekers—Sikh extremists from India—were granted leave of stay in Britain last year. The foreign office official maintained that the figure was "none". However, he conceded that there might have been a confusion between "nine" and "none."

The foreign office was also unhappy about articles related to the likely signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on defence between Britain and India. Sir Terence Woods, head of the South Asia division of the foreign office, asserted that he was unaware of any such protocol being in the offing. This view was, in fact, endorsed by Mr Desmond Bowen, head of defence sales to South Asia in the British ministry of defence.

The matter of a MOU on defence has been under discussion for some time, but not with any degree of urgency of late. The high commission at a lunch for Indian foreign correspondents on Wednesday, however, explicitly revealed, though incorrectly, that an agreement would be initiated shortly. On determining the real situation, an attempt was made to retract the statement, but by that time it was too late.

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CSO: 4600/1550

INDIA

WORLD SIKHS MAY CHANGE HEADQUARTERS, LEADER

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 11 Mar 86 p 4

[Text] Washington, March 10 (UNI): The World Sikh Organisation (WSO) has decided to shift its headquarters to Ottawa amid reports that Gen. J.S. Bhullar (retd) is stepping down from the WSO leadership.

The decision marks the beginning of many key changes in the hardline Sikh organisation.

Informed sources here said these changes reflected a watershed stage, with the old guard which spearheaded the hardliner's secessionist campaign being moved out in favour of young, more active and fundamentalist Sikhs.

The sources believe the changes are the result of Mr Bhullar's decision to move away from the activities of hardline Sikh organisations in the West in an effort to start preparing ground for his eventual return to India. Mr Bhullar's immigration status is unsure in the US and Canada will not allow him into its territory.

The expected exit of Mr Bhullar has now left the movement open for a take-over by a more active, fundamentalist and comparatively young Sikh leadership.

At a recent meeting in New Jersey, it was decided that Mr Gian Singh Sandhu would become the president of WSO and Mr Gurcharan Singh was confirmed as the secretary. Both live in Canada and are active in WSO affairs.

With WSO now coming entirely under the control of Canada-based Sikhs, it is clear that it will strive to cement working relations with the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) and the Babbar Khalsa, both of

Sikhs have demanded the creation of Khalistan.

Their alliance with WSO, with its superior resources and reach in terms of membership and administration is bound to boost their striking power.

Even his critics acknowledge that Mr Bhullar had sobering influence on many radical WSO members. While the damage he has caused to Hindu-Sikh relations cannot be underrated, he did, however, manage to keep the WSO from going overboard in pursuit of possible violent means of seeking revenge, especially after the November 1984 riots.

The Indian council general in Toronto, Mr Surinder Lal Malik, also argues that with the shifting of the WSO headquarters to Ottawa and by bringing it within the reach of many radicals, many of whom previously could never obtain US visas, WSO's identity with the cause of aggrieved Sikhs following the Golden Temple action may soon vanish.

WSO's move from the US to Canada comes under pressure from both the US authorities and the hardline Sikhs.

As far as US pressure on WSO is concerned, no official confirmation is available but sources say that once the WSO leadership saw India's significance to the US—politically and economically—and given US's strong aversion to any secessionist movement, they knew that their time was up in Washington. All that was needed was an excuse and Mr Bhullar's reported decision to quit WSO had acted as a catalyst.

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CSO: 4600/1551

INDIA

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSAM ACCORD BEGINS, TRIBALS EVICTED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 12 Mar 86 p 9

[Text]

GUWAHATI, March 11.
IMPLEMENTATION of the Assam accord began yesterday, when state forest officials launched a massive drive to evict Boro tribals from the Bogajuli unclassed forests in the Tamulpur area of Nalbari district.

The officials, accompanied by policemen, used two elephants to demolish about 600 mud huts of the tribals, who have been living there since 1979.

According to a resident of the area, Mr. Nandeshwar Brahma, who rushed to Guwahati to inform the All-Assam Tribal Students' Union about the operation, personnel of the Assam forest battalion along with the circle officer of Tamulpur arrived at the village shortly before noon yesterday without any warning or notice to the tribals and began demolishing the huts. Most of the men, afraid of police harassment, left their families behind and hid in the nearby forests.

The tribal students' union has urged the people not to leave their homes and to resist all attempts by the authorities

to drive them away from the area. According to the union leader, Mr. Ranuaj Pegu, the land "rightfully belongs" to the tribals and no one has a right to evict them without providing alternative accommodation.

"Our people have suffered for long and we will not allow them to be browbeaten by the authorities again," he said here.

The Boros whose homes were destroyed yesterday were originally settled in the Boyang reserve forests on the Assam Nagaland border. After a ghastly midnight massacre on January 5, 1979, in which armed Naga villagers crept into their sleeping villages and indiscriminately killed men, women and children, the survivors fled to the Bogajuli forests. The then Janata government appealed to the Boros to return to their villages but most of them refused to do so.

Since then, the tribals have lived in the Bogajuli forests under constant threat of eviction. This is the sixth time they have been forced by the Nalbari district authorities to leave their homes.

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CSO: 4600/1552

17 April 1986

INDIA

INFLUENCE OVER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SEEN ERODING

Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Mar 86 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text] NEW DELHI, March 4.

There is an uneasy feeling in Government circles here that India's efforts to befriend its neighbours with well-meaning gestures have not made the desired impact on them, resulting in an erosion of the country's capacity to influence the course of events in the region.

If the volatile relationship with Sri Lanka is treated as a litmus test for judging the success or failure of India's good-neighbourly diplomacy, the deep-rooted animosities in Pakistan towards this country that surface at the slightest provocation continue to dishearten those in Delhi who have been making an ambitious bid to usher in a new era of more harmonious and mutually beneficial links.

The setback in Sri Lanka has, no doubt, disappointed and even disheartened the protagonists of this policy who hoped to dispel the misgivings of some of the neighbouring countries which talk of India's hegemonic ambitions. But it has not deterred them from persevering with their attempt to press forward with the mediatory role in the belief that sooner or later both the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil leaders would veer round to the view that there is no alternative to a political solution based on balance of concessions by both sides.

Tragic tangle: It is this assumption which is sustaining the faith of the Indian mediators that they are bound to succeed ultimately in resolving this tragic tangle, if only they do not give up their conciliatory efforts in despair or disgust in the face of recurring rebuffs and retractions. The latest internal debate at the higher policy-making levels of the Government is therefore directed at synthesising the Sri Lankan and the Tamil United Liberation Front's proposals and work out a middle position that could be put forward to the two sides as a fair basis for a negotiated settlement.

This is a complex and thankless exercise that has to be handled with great caution, without running the risk of not merely disappointing both sides but also forfeiting their confidence in the bargain and, in the process, complicating the search for an equitable solution. It is for this reason that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has chosen to proceed with utmost circumspection instead of attempting to force the pace of events.

He is attaching the utmost importance to the restoration of some degree of normality in Sri

Lanka, before resuming the Indian mediatory efforts. The senseless killings of innocent Tamils by the Sri Lankan security forces have so vitiated the atmosphere that, even if his advisers are able to conjure up a new peace formula that stands a reasonable chance of acceptance, it would be impossible to persuade the Tamil leaders to resume the dialogue while the Sri Lankan Army remains on the rampage in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

Lofty stance: In dealing with this ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, the Government of India can at least adopt a lofty stance in performing the role of an honest broker, a friendly mediator, a good samaritan with no axe to grind other than helping the people of a neighbouring country to settle their differences and live together in peace again. But there is no such ready explanation for the vagaries of the country's Pakistan policy, which has all the ingredients of high expectations generated by simulated enthusiasm and sudden disavowal in the wake of fresh provocations.

The exasperating experience of dealing with Sri Lankan duplicity and Pakistani deception has made the Indian policy-makers wonder whether the country's enlightened self-interest would be better served by reverting to the earlier approach of talking to its neighbours from a position of strength or by placating them with gestures that can be misconstrued as signs of weakness in attempting to extract further concessions.

Talks with China: This new ambivalence has also been hampering the Government's style in handling the talks with China which is in no hurry to settle the border dispute except on its own terms. The country has consequently been left with no coherent policy on China, since nobody in authority is prepared to take a hard look at this problem. There is talk of a fresh review of the Indian strategy for formulating a new policy line before the next round of official level talks in Beijing later this year. But there was no sign of any preparatory work for conducting this internal debate with a better grasp of what is possible which is quite different from what is desirable in negotiating a border settlement.

The same sort of lack of precision in thought and clarity of purpose seems to prevail in dealings with Bangladesh and Nepal—and even Bhutan which will be resuming its border talks with China soon.

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CSO: 4600/1549

INDIA

HARYANA CHIEF MINISTER ON TERMS FOR CHANDIGARH TRANSFER

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 8 Mar 86 p 6

[Text]

Chandigarh, March 7 (PTI): The Haryana chief minister, Mr Bhajan Lal, today said that Chandigarh would not be given to Punjab unless his state got the Hindi-speaking areas of Fazilka and Abohar and the vital Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal was completed simultaneously.

Talking to newsmen here, he said the transfer of territories and the construction of the canal should form a "package deal".

Reacting sharply to the statement by the Punjab chief minister, Mr Surjit Singh Barnala, in the Punjab Assembly yesterday that Haryana had no share in river waters, he said the Justice Eradi water tribunal must decide on Haryana's share in the river waters which had been appointed in the tripartite accord of December 13, 1981.

He demanded that the Centre should also take up the construction work of the canal which had been suspended since Barnala government had assumed office five months ago.

He wondered, if Haryana had no share in the waters, how Mr Barnala's government had itself collected Rs 50 crores out of Rs 110.50 crores from Haryana towards the construction of the canal, which was stipulated to be completed by August 15 in the accord.

Mr Bhajan Lal said instead of blaming him for putting hurdles in the implementation of the

accord, it was the Akali government in Punjab which was not sincere in implementing it.

Commenting on the statement of Mr Barnala in the Assembly yesterday that there was no use for the carrier channel, the Haryana irrigation and power minister, Mr Shamsher Singh Surjewala, said this statement amounted to a "total" change in the Punjab government's stand. He told newsmen here that by making such a statement, Mr Barnala had backed out of the accord.

Mr Surjewala said under the present circumstances, there was no other alternative left with the government of India but to take over the construction of the canal and complete it at least by the end of this year, if not on schedule by August 15. **Cong-I statement:** Several senior Congress(I) leaders in Punjab today expressed serious concern over the deteriorating law and order situation in the state and strongly condemned the killing of seven persons in Kapurthala yesterday.

In a statement, they said that "it is shocking that the culprits are not being apprehended, and after every killing they escape."

The signatories include Mr Vinod Sharma and Mr Gulzar Singh, general secretaries of the PCC(I), and Mr Sewa Ram, MLA and secretary, Punjab Congress(I) Legislative Party..

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CSO: 4600/1549

INDIA

PAPERS REPORT DROUGHT CONDITIONS, HARVEST PROSPECTS

Tamil Nadu Grain Output

Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Mar 86 p 1

[Text]

MADRAS, March 4.

Rice production in Tamil Nadu this year is likely to be around 54-lakh tonnes, the same as last year's, in spite of drought and water supply difficulty in the Cauvery delta. The total foodgrains production is expected to be in the neighbourhood of 100-lakh tonnes.

Expressing this optimism, the Agriculture Minister, Mr. K. Kalimuthu, told newsmen today that the increased productivity achieved with the cooperation of farmers all over the State, to a great extent had offset the adverse impact of the drought conditions in Thanjavur district.

By and large, the farmers had followed the practices suggested by the department for "5 tonnes of paddy a hectare programme". Almost 50 per cent of the farmers had succeeded in the programme. In a few pockets like Polachiyamalai and Mettupalayam, the production had touched 10 tonnes a hectare.

The department was gearing itself to give a push to the programme of summer cultivation, the Minister said. Arrangements were being made to provide inputs in adequate quantities, so that larger areas could be cropped this season. The programme was to raise paddy on 2.75-lakh hectares, and millets on 2.76-lakh hectares. Pulses would be grown on 3-lakh hectares and cotton on 70,000 hectares.

With the thrust given to oilseeds production Mr. Kalimuthu said, there had been a gradual increase in both the acreage and output of coconut in the last three years. Compared with 1.4-lakh hectares under coconut in 1982-83, the present area was 1.54-lakh hectares. The output of nuts had also increased from 133 crores to 158 crores during the period. The programme of distributing 35-lakh high-yielding seedlings a year would be continued, he said.

Drought in Eight States

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 8 Mar 86 p 5

[Excerpts]

New Delhi, March 7 (PTI): Eight states and two Union territories have reported drought conditions during 1985-86 and the Centre has sanctioned Rs 527.32 crores as assistance so far; Mr Yogendra Makwana, minister of state of agriculture, informed the Rajya Sabha today.

The minister said Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and the Union territories of Pondicherry and Mizoram have reported drought conditions. Actual conversion charges from short-term loan into medium-term loan had been estimated at Rs 1.72 crores, he added.

The Centre has departed from its established norms in rushing relief to Karnataka and Rajasthan which have been affected

by severe drought, the agriculture minister, Mr Buta Singh, said.

Answering a spate of supplementaries, the minister said the Centre has agreed to bear the entire transportation cost of fodder from any part of the country.

Mr Buta Singh also informed the House that the Centre would come forward with substantial financial assistance to meet foodgrains shortage in Karnataka.

Flood losses: The country suffered an average damage of about Rs 316.67 crores a year on crops due to floods and cyclones during the period 1953 to 1985.

The water resources minister, Mr B. Shankaranand, said more than four million hectares of cropped area was affected every year during this period.

Gujarat Drought Damage

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 11 Mar 86 p 7

[Text] Ahmedabad, March 10--The unprecedent drought in nearly two-thirds of Gujarat covering 16 districts has dealt a severe blow to the farm economy and sustaining power of the ural poor. Farmers have suffered losses of Rs 976 crores owing to the failure of the monsoon last year.

According to rough estimates, yields of kharif crops, including pulses, was 2.2 million tonnes less than the target. The production of oilseeds, including groundnut, in Saurashtra, considered to be the edible oil bowl, was one million tonnes less than the estimated figure.

Rabi crop yields have not reached even the half-way mark with the production of only 9.12 lakh tonnes as against the target of over two million tonnes.

There is hardly any hope for the summer crops, except in the perennially irrigated patches in Central and Southern Gujarat.

This has driven lakhs of landless labourers and small farmers to flock to relief works started by the state government. It has declared 12,600 of the total 19,000 villages in the state as scarcity and semi-scarcity hit.

Agitation Loss

Of the total 20 million people affected by drought, two million are small and marginal farmers or farm workers.

The government has prepared a Rs 405-crore master plan to deal with food, fodder, drinking water and the employment problems of the people in the affected areas. The financial allocation is likely to be raised by another Rs 50 crores in the next few days to increase the tempo of relief work. The Centre has sanctioned Rs 82.14 crores so far on the basis of a survey conducted by a Central team.

The state government has been forced to suspend work on some irrigation projects and curtail some other development works to save funds for relief works. The state had suffered a staggering loss of about Rs 2,200 crores last year owing to the anti-reservation agitation.

The government has recently increased the daily wages of relief workers from Rs seven to RS 11. It is expected to incur at least Rs 210.5 crores for providing the affected people with gainful employment.

The government has earmarked Rs 28 crores for purchasing fodder and transporting it to various district and taluka centres. It has been estimated that out of a total of 11.15 million cattle population, fodder will have to be supplied for 9.5 million animals. Cattle camps, panjarapoles and goshalas are planned.

Grains Urged

The government has banned the export of fodder outside the state. It has reserved the entire fodder output of Bulsar district (which along with Dangs has been spared from nature's fury) to be distributed in the affected areas.

In addition, the government has earmarked Rs 17 crores for providing seed taccavi and short-term loans for groundnut and fodder and taccavi for other farmers.

The government has urged the Centre to rush coarse grains of 20,000 tonnes per month. It has asked for an increased allotment of 131,000 tonnes of palmolein oil during 1985-86. It has also sought 40,000 tonnes of wheat and 30,000 tonnes of rice per month till September.

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CSO: 4600/1549

IRAN

TABRIZ VIEWS U.S. 'RETREAT' FROM GULF OF SIDRA

GF011726 Tabriz International Service in Azeri 1715 GMT 31 Mar 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, the naval exercises carried out by the aggressive U.S. forces in the Gulf of Sidra have been abandoned and left incomplete. The aggressive U.S. forces were ordered to quickly depart from the Gulf of Sidra in order to avert a new defeat for U.S. foreign policy. (?Why were the) U.S. exercises along Libya's shores abandoned despite the effort which was made to carry them out successfully? Is this not an indication of a state of helplessness on the part of the decisionmaking centers in Washington? Has the dangerous outcome of maintaining the presence of the U.S. naval fleet along Libya's shores caused anxiety in Washington? The answers to these questions are in the affirmative. Washington has shown through its action that it will (?retreat) before peoples and countries reluctant to yield to pressures applied by the big powers.

By ordering the U.S. fleet's retreat from Libya's shores, Reagan has proved how helpless Washington's decisionmaking centers are before the resistance of the peoples and how quickly they are daunted by it. These centers are aware that when it is time to move they cannot trust the drunken and doomed U.S. military officials to make correct predictions over military moves. The Libyan people are savoring the sweet taste of victory against a big power. By entirely depending on their own strength, the Libyan people proved that sooner or later courage forces the big powers to retreat.

This time Washington sensed that all the facts were against the aggressor. The military personnel who dominate the decisionmaking centers in the United States achieved no satisfying results. Three U.S. aircraft were hit above Libyan shores and downed in the Gulf of Sidra. This made the United States realize that it had not penetrated a safe region. The Libyan shores are not suitable for the U.S. aggressors. The Libyan people have proved that they will not leave the stage to the aggressors and will retaliate with fire. The decisionmakers in Washington realized very quickly that the matter was serious but they had no means of ending Reagan's empty moves.

However, the halting of the incomplete naval exercises along Libya's shores also proved the existence of thoughtful individuals among the U.S.

decisionmakers--individuals who realized the situation was worsening. They realized that the United States was playing with fire on the shores of Libya and dealing (?irreparable) blows on a small country with its aggressive measures. They realized well that the people of the United States would not agree to receive the corpses of the victims of the new U.S. foreign policy. They quickly realized that Libya was not Grenada and the drunken and doomed U.S. military officials were confronted with a united people on Libya's shores.

The reasons for the U.S. naval fleet's shameful withdrawal from Libyan waters prove that the people are well-prepared to give lessons to the big powers on the definition and recognition of their positions--lessons which these powers are reluctant to learn by themselves. They are prepared to repeat these lessons over and over again with the hope that the drunken and doomed U.S. military officials will realize that the Islamic countries are not a safe place for any foreign military force.

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CSO: 1831/419

IRAN

KHAMENEI ADDRESSES NATION ON REVOLUTION

LD202237 Tehran IRNA in English 2229 GMT 20 Mar 86

[Text] Tehran, March 21, IRNA--In his message to the nation on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, President Khamene'i expressed hope that in the new year, a better effort would be devoted to serving the oppressed masses, doing better in public welfare and improving the quality of secondary school and higher education by removing some of the blemishes which he said are the heritage of the past.

He also expressed hope that the new year 1365 would mark Iran's eventual triumph in the Iraq-Iran war.

President Khamene'i said the past year marked Iran's breakthrough both in the battlefronts with the Iraqi regime and in the international scenes.

He said as a result of Iran's efforts at the international scenes, more and more people especially in Africa had learned about the Islamic revolution.

He said, once the Iranian people and the Islamic Government have thoroughly done away with the roots of all evils, once they have established social justice in its full sense and once they have made their country self-sufficient in know-how and industrial production they shall have then conveyed the true message of the Islamic revolution to the world peoples.

Khamene'i expressed hope that this year the Iranian people would take one full stride towards their ultimate goal and that the nation would continue to march on a firm path to cultural, economic and political independence.

The president also offered his special greetings to the relatives of martyrs, of war-wounded, and of missing and prisoners of war on the occasion of the new year.

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CSO: 4600/262

IRAN

KHOMEINI DISCUSSES UNCHANGED WAR POLICY

LD241338 Tehran IRNA in English 1330 GMT 24 Mar 86

[Text] Tehran, March 24, IRNA--The leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Imam Khomeyni, said here Monday that if Iraqi ruler Saddam Husayn won his imposed war against Iran, none of the regional countries would experience tranquility.

Imam Khomeyni was speaking to a group of visitors, including Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, Prime Minister Musavi, foreign diplomatic corps in Iran, and a number of other officials on the occasion of the birth anniversary of Imam 'Ali (AS), the first Shi'ite Muslim imam, at Jamaran Mosque Monday morning.

He stressed that countries of the Persian Gulf region were not aware how Saddam would treat them if he became victorious.

Imam Khomeyni noted that all Iranian people, old and young, men and women, were well prepared to continue the fight until the achievement of final victory.

Referring to Iran's war policy, Imam Khomeyni said that the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the issue of the war had not changed and reiterated that "as long as this Aflaqi party (Iraqi Ba'th party) exists, we will fight to remove this cancerous tumor."

In fact, he said, the Islamic Republic of Iran was not fighting, but rather defending Islam. The city of Al-Faw was the center for Iraqi attacks against Iran and the Islamic combatants of Iran by liberating the city, defended Islam, the Imam added.

The Imam stressed that it was the duty of all Iranians to go to war fronts and uprise to defend Islam, adding that those who could not attend battle-fields should assist behind the fronts.

The founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran said that what the country was facing was not an issue only relevant to Shi'ite Muslims but rather an issue related to Islam.

He said that when the big powers understood that Islam could provoke a forty-plus million population to revolt against them, therefore, they hatched plots against Islam.

Imam Khomeyni congratulated the occasion to all Shi'ite Muslims and Muslims throughout the world.

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CSO: 4600/263

IRAN

UN SECURITY COUNCIL ATTACKED OVER IRAQ

GF241711 Tabriz International Service in Azeri 1715 GMT 23 Mar 86

[Text] [Passage indistinct] The supporters of the Iraqi regime have endeavored to prevent the UN Security Council from passing a resolution clearly exposing this matter [presumably the use of chemical arms] and agree to suffice with a mere statement. This indicates that the Islamic Republic of Iran's demands for the exposing of the violations of international law are not heeded. It is obvious that the UN Security Council members prefer to remain silent in that regard. However, the dispatch of Iranian fighters wounded as a result of the use of chemical arms to West European countries has informed the world peoples of the horrible crimes--crimes which have resulted in the martyrdom of 2,000 troops and the wounding of another 20,000.

It is obvious that the UN Security Council is indirectly responsible for the crimes. Until it takes serious measures to criticize Iraq's onslaught against the land of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is impossible to expect the aggressive Iraqi regime to refrain from openly violating international law. The Iraqi regime has not only violated the 1925 Geneva Convention, it has also trampled upon the provisions of international law over the past 5 years--including those related to the treatment of prisoners of war, attacks on residential regions and merchant ships, and (?attacks) on passenger aircraft. The UN Security Council, however, has failed to demonstrate the slightest reaction against all this.

A Western newspaper commentator has stated that the council should criticize itself for failing to adopt the right position over the past 5 years. Had the UN Security Council criticized the Iraqi onslaught against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the supporters of the Iraqi regime would not have been able to continue to give multilateral support to it. As such, the war would have ended a few days after it began.

Regrettably, however, the UN Security Council's failure to adopt the right stance has given an opportunity to the supporters of Saddam to continue the delivery of different types of arms to his regime with a view to supporting its attacks against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The question as to who has supplied chemical arms to the Iraqi regime concerns the people of the world at the present time. Aren't the permanent members of the UN Security

Council--the United States and Great Britain in particular--the countries which supply chemical substances to Iraq? Therefore, how can the contrast between the condemnation of Iraq and the delivery of chemical arms to Baghdad be removed?

/6091

CSO: 1831/420

COMMENTARY URGES ARAB LEAGUE STATES TO CONDEMN IRAQ

LD291346 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1048 GMT 29 Mar 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Our country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently issued a statement in response to the recent resolution of the Arab League's foreign ministers. While noting once again the just demands of the Muslim nation of Iran regarding the imposed war, and stressing that Islamic Iran does not covet any part of Iraqi territory or of other neighboring countries, the statement declares: From the point of view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a league which has shown no reaction except silence in the face of the aggression of an Arab country against the territorial integrity of a country that, from the time of the emergence of the Islamic revolution, has been defending Islamic-Arab aspirations, the liberation of noble Jerusalem and the destruction of the Zionist enemy--even when many Arab countries encouraged and supported this aggression--is not qualified to issue its opinion on the future of the war and the conduct of affairs concerning it. And it is better if this league were, in the least, to speak out about Iraq's war crimes to the countries and organizations which do not even believe in Islam, but which have been forced to admit the extensive war crimes of the Iraqi regime, and force the overpowered Iraqi regime to conform to the Islamic, humanitarian and international standards and regulations of the arenas of war.

It is interesting to note that, in spite of the fact that it is quite clear that Iraq was responsible for starting the aggression and for violating the territorial integrity of Islamic Iran and trampling on international laws and regulations with regard to the issues of the war, the said league, regardless of its unjustifiable reluctance to come to terms with these Iraqi acts, has for some time, through the seven-member committee of the Arab League, openly inaugurated activities intended to support the Iraqi regime. However, these efforts, just like other plots--due to the self-sacrificing and selfless devotion of the Muslim people and government of Iran--have not brought about any change in the situation of the falling Iraqi regime. As the trend of events has shown, the continuation of military, political and economic support for Iraq and plots against the Islamic Republic will not alter the final outcome of the war and the victory of the Muslim nation of Iran over global imperialism. It would be appropriate if

the said countries, while taking note of the realities related to the imposed war, especially the recent successes of the soldiers of Islam in the victorious Val-Fajr-8 operations, which expose the weakness and helplessness and disintegration of the Iraqi Army, should not jeopardize the grounds for the recovery and expansion of their relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

/6091
CSO: 4640/241

PAKISTAN

BENAZIR'S ARRIVAL IN PAKISTAN AWAITED

Karachi DAWN in English 17 Mar 86 p 1

[Text]

LAHORE, March 16: Ms. Benazir Bhutto is expected to return home on April 10 from London. She will land at the Lahore Airport and address a public meeting the following day to begin a tour of the country during which she is expected to address about 30 mass rallies. Her tour of the four provinces will last for about 45 days.

The Central Executive Committee of the Pakistan People's Party, which ended its two-day meeting here, is understood to have communicated to the Acting Chairperson a tentative programme for her proposed nationwide tour. Ms Bhutto's final programme will be announced

from London.

The tour programme, as chalked out by the party's Central Executive Committee, plans about 15 public meetings in the Punjab. From the Punjab she will go to the NWFP where she is expected to address about four mass rallies. Sind comes next where she will address 12 public meetings followed by two mass rallies in Baluchistan.

In the Punjab the cities where she will address rallies, include Lahore, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Pakpattan, Okara, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Alipur, Sargodha and Dera Ghazi Khan, she is expected to complete the Punjab tour in about 16 days.

The PPP's executive has, meanwhile, approved the report on provincial autonomy and constitutional amendments in this connection drafted by an MRD committee headed by Malik Mohammad Qasim. The committee favoured maximum powers to the federating units and adequate decentralisation to satisfy the people of the smaller provinces in particular.

However, it has made it clear that the proposed constitutional amendments to grant maximum provincial autonomy will be made only by a parliament elected under the 1973 Constitution.

The central executive committee [word unreadable] two resolutions on Sunday. Other resolutions will be released on Monday.

One of the two resolutions urges Gen. Zia-ul-Haq to surrender unlimited powers which he had acquired through the new constitution of 1985 and by retaining the office of the Chief of Army Staff. It also demands fresh elections under the 1973 Constitution in the 'best interest' of the nation.

It says that the abrogation of the federal, parliamentary, democratic and Islamic Constitution of 1973 and the promulgation of a constitution given by a single man which was passed by a parliament elected under a non-party and non-political system, has endangered national integrity.

The resolution declares total solidarity with the objectives of the MRD and assures its fullest cooperation and coordination to the alliance till the achievement of its objectives. It also describes the expected return of Ms Benazir Bhutto as "a good omen" for the early realisation of democratic objectives and hopes that all the patriotic and democratic forces would extend their cooperation for the success of the countrywide peaceful mass movement under Miss Bhutto's leadership.

The second resolution con-

demned the incidents at Mazai, Gaddoan and said that it was the inalienable right of peasants to sow the crop of their own choice, but if the government, "under the dictates of the US imperialism" and the proposal of the Narcotic Control Board wanted to acquire that land it was morally and legally bound to pay a compensation to the peasants. The resolution demanded a compensation of Rs 1 million each to the families of 20 killed farmers and Rs 500,000 each to the injured. It also called for the release of those still under arrest.

/12851
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JPRS*NEA*86-049
17 April 1986

PAKISTAN

JATOI EXPRESSES VIEWS ON CONSTITUTIONAL VACUUM, DICTATORSHIP

Karachi DAWN in English 17 Mar 86 pp 1, 4

[Article by M. A. Mansuri]

[Text] LONDON, March 16: Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, President, PPP Sind on Saturday night said he was opposed to dictatorial trend whether in the party or in the country, and was committed to oppose it everywhere.

Addressing a gathering of over 100 political workers at a dinner, arranged in his honour in a London restaurant by Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Mr. Jatoi said political parties would never succeed in their struggle for restoration of democracy in the country if they did not practise democracy themselves.

Mr Jatoi's speech was punctuated by loud slogans of "Kharto Jatoi, Bhai Bhai".

Earlier, about half a dozen speakers, representing various parties including Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Qaumi Mahaze Azadi and Pak Afghan Society, paid tributes to Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Khar for his services to the cause of democracy in the country and Pakistan itself, with the hope that Mr. Khar and Mr. Jatoi symbols of unity between the two most populous Provinces of Pakistan — will continue to cooperate in the struggle to save Pakistan.

Mr. Jatoi said the country was passing through a very critical period. The propaganda that Martial law has been lifted and democracy has been restored was not correct. The shadow of Martial Law Government was till there he said, adding that the same person held the office of the country's President who continued to be the Chief of Army Staff, and there was also a

Defence Minister. This was an unprecedented situation, full of contradictions, and the country must be pulled out of it.

ELECTIONS: He severely criticised the recent elections in Pakistan, and said none of the contestants had a mandate from the people. Zia-ul-Haq had no right to amend the 1973 constitution which had been framed after a massive effort by elected representatives of all the four Provinces. The amended Constitution, he added, was not acceptable to the people because it had been made by a dictator to promote his own interests.

He said the slogan for confederal system had been encouraged by the people's sense of deprivation for a long period of eight and a half years. Now the position was such that unless the quantum of provincial autonomy was increased, the condition will never improve. He regretted that the 1983 movement in Sind was described by the military government as a secessionist movement, though in fact, it was "save Pakistan movement" this had caused more disappointment among the people, he added.

1973 CONSTITUTION: Mr. Jatoi said he agreed with Wali Khan and others who demanded a new Constitution for the country. But, he said, he and his colleagues believed that for the cause of the country's integrity the 1973 Constitution should be brought back through the Assembly, and thereafter an effort should be made to resolve issues like quantum of provincial autonomy. Otherwise, he feared,

the country would continue to be without a Constitution for a long time which, he thought, will be more dangerous.

He said Pakistan was the creation of vote, and only the right of vote can keep it intact. Therefore, he thought, contradictions brought about by the Provisional Constitutional Order and the recent referendum and elections must be removed. This objective can be achieved only by the restoration of the 1973 Constitution and holding elections under that. Otherwise, he claimed, the country's integrity would be endangered.

Claiming that conditions had been going from bad to worse because of dictatorial trends in the country, he said when Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and Mr. Z. A. Bhutto came out against dictatorship, Ayub Khan had already become a

civilian President. Still he had to yield to people's pressure. Later, Yahya, Khan held fair and free elections mainly because he had been misinformed about the situation, but he declined to hand over power and the results were disastrous.

SAFE INVESTMENTS: However, he said never before, even under the British rule, such big reliance of Martial Law courts and flogging was seen as under the last Martial Law. Even now, he claimed, when the Martial Law is claimed to have been lifted, hundreds of people were rotting in

jails, and the punishments awarded by Martial Law Courts had been legalised.

He said he appreciated the struggle put up from abroad by Pakistanis living in exile for the cause of the country. He promised that the PPP when it came to power, would set up special machinery to guide their money to safe investments and eliminate red-tape. Many of them, he said, had murder cases and other serious charges pending against them in Pakistan and they could not go back home until the situation improved.

Mr Jatoi said he himself had suffered a lot. When he was in England last time, his family in Pakistan was served with a two-week notice with a demand for Rs. 25 lakh as income tax fines. He refused to bow down to such pressures, sold the ginning factory that was built by his father, and paid the demanded sum. He said his most precious asset was his credibility, and he would never betray people's expectations. He believed that every effort must be made for the survival of the country, as all other interests depended on its survival.

A large number of office-bearers, former MNAs, Senators, MPAs and former provincial Ministers have appealed to the people to accord a rousing welcome to Mr Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, President, Pakistan People's Party, Sind, on his arrival here from London on March 21.

/12851

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PAKISTAN

GHAFFAR KHAN CALLS FOR 'PARTY 'FOR THE OPPRESSED'

Karachi DAWN in English 17 Mar 86 pp 1, 3

[Text] KARACHI, March 16: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan on Sunday underlined the need for forming a "separate party" of the Sindhis, Baluch and Pakhtoons who, he said, were *mazloom* (the oppressed lot).

It was his sincere desire that the people of the three smaller provinces should, by common agreement, have an action programme for their "salvation", he added.

Bacha Khan was speaking at a dinner hosted in his honour by Dr Hameeda Khuhro at her residence. Prominent among those present were Mr Ali Ahmad Khan Talpur, Mr Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Mr Abdul Khaliq Khan and Mr Fareed Toofan (the last two have accompanied Mr Ghaffar Khan from Peshawar), Syed Imdad Mohammad Shah and Mr Liaquat Baluch, MPAs; Mr Abid Zuberi, Mr Mujib Pirzada, Mr Hakim Ali Zardari, Mr Shafi Mohammadi, Mr Haroon Ahmed, Mr P.K. Shahani, Haji Sher Khan and Mr Ahmad Ali Soomro.

Mentioning Punjab by name, Mr Ghaffar Khan complained that nearly 40 years had elapsed since the inception of Pakistan, yet they (the Punjabis) do not consider "us" their brethren. "Even now we are being treated as slaves".

He said "darkness" had spread all around and there was no light at the end of the tunnel. Until now, there had been restrictions on the movement of politicians, but when these were lifted, he had taken the first opportunity to visit Sind to have reactions of the people to his proposal of a "separate platform" of the Sindhis, Baluch and Pakhtoons.

Mr Ghaffar Khan recalled that in 1983 (when the MRD's pro-democracy movement was

launched) he had told his (Pakhtoon) people not to join in the struggle unless Punjab had taken the lead.

He had then argued that even if democracy was restored, of what use will that be to them (the people of smaller provinces), since it will be Punjab which will continue to "rule" as ever before.

Strange is the way of politics in Pakistan, Bacha Khan said, while pointing out that when the time for general elections came, Punjab made every haste in deciding to take part.

On the other hand, "when I talk of the rights of my people, the Punjabis who control the Press and the bureaucracy call me a traitor, a Hindu and anti-Pakistan", he added.

Mr Ghaffar Khan pointed out that since there was no way of taking the people into confidence through the Press, he had undertaken such a long journey to be with them (Sindhis) and to know how they felt about a united platform for the Sindhis, Baluch and Pakhtoon people.

Earlier, Dr Hameeda Khuhro in her welcome speech said that Pakhtoons and Sindhis were united in their resolve not to let the Kalabagh Dam project be forced on them. Besides, she said, there were many other problems in common between the people of the three smaller provinces, one of them being the question of full autonomy, which they had to solve unitedly.

Dr Khuhro said people were "very fortunate" in having inspiration and guidance from Mr Ghaffar Khan despite his advanced age.

The Khudai Khidmatgar leader spent Sunday receiving a number

of delegations representing the Pakhtoon Students Federation and the Pakhtoon United Front and others representig the Seraiki "province", the legal fraternity and the Lyari area.

In addition, a two-member delegation from the Ahmadiya community also waited on Mr Ghaffar Khan.

When contacted, Mr Mumtaz Bhutto, told *Dawn* he had met Mr Ghaffar Khan for the first time on Saturday night and was, indeed, very impressed by him.

Mr Mumtaz Bhutto said he explained to Bacha Khan the aims and objects of the Sindhi-Baluch-

Pakhtoon Front (SBPF) and the latter listened to him with rapt attention. Asked whether there was any meeting ground, Mr Bhutto smiled and said Mr Ghaffar Khan wil be visiting Larkana soon, implying he would have further talks with Bacha Khan.

Mr Ghaffar Khan, accompanied by Dr Hameeda Khuhro and Syed Imdad Mohammad Shah, MPA, (son of Mr G.M. Syed), will leave by road early on Monday morning for Saan (Dadu District), home village of Mr Syed, where he will participate in Mr Syed's birthday celebrations.

/12851
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PAKISTAN

BIZENJO SAYS NEW LEFTIST PARTY TO BE FORMED

Karachi DAWN in English 23 Mar 86 p 12

[Text]

QUETTA, March 22: A single Leftwing party, composed of principal progressive and democratic parties of Pakistan, will be formed in the near future which will strike for national democracy in the country.

This was stated by Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo, President, Pakistan National Party at an exclusive interview with 'PPI' here on Saturday.

He said the new party would be purely a democratic, anti-imperialistic and secular and it would stand for the right of nationalities and for effective enforcement of true national democracy in the country.

He said initially six progressive and democratic parties i.e. Pakistan National Party (PNP), National Democratic Party (NDP), Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP), Pakistan Mutahida Mahaz and Awami Tehrik have already agreed in principle on the formation of a single Leftwing party in Pakistan.

The name of the sixth component party of new leftwing party would be announced on March 26, 1986.

All the six components of the proposed party would meet at Karachi to consider constitution and process of amalgamation of the existing progressive and democratic parties of the country into a

single and strong opposition party.

Two members from each progressive and democratic existing parties have been included in a committee headed by Sardar Shaukat Ali, General Secretary, Mazdoor Kisan Party.

Mr. Bizenjo said the committee had already prepared a common manifesto for the proposed progressive and democratic party.

Mr. Bizenjo said: Once there is general consensus on the manifesto constitution and process of amalgamation of existing progressive and democratic parties for this single Leftwing party. Then its executive committee would meet to prepare a line of action for achieving objectives spelled out by the proposed party.

Replying to a question, Mr. Bizenjo said the proposed Leftwing party would work within the framework of MRD which is striving for the restoration of democracy under 1973 Constitution and for the return of a popular elected government in the country.

LYARI: Later addressing a Press conference at Press Club here on Saturday the PNP chief expressed grave concern over growing incidents in Lyari area of Karachi and called for complete halt to police action against the people.—PPI

/12851
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PAKISTAN

CONFEDERATION IDEA ANALYZED, OPPOSED

Karachi DAWN in English 22, 23 Mar 86

[Articles by Makhdoom Ali Khan: "The Myth of a Confederal Option...PART I; and "Core Issue: Balancing Central Authority With Provincial Rights...PART II"]

[22 Mar 86 p 7]

[Text] CONTROVERSIES about the nature and form of government are usually resolved by nations in the early years of their independence. With the growth of political culture and development of constitutional government discussion is directed towards the resolution of more complex problems. In our case, however, thirtyeight years after freedom was won the debate on primary issues continues unabated. Recently, it has been joined by Mr. Mumtaz Bhutto and his Sindhi-Baloch-Pushtoon Front colleagues.

A confederal constitution is being presented as a solution to our problems. The idea is not new. This is not the first time that such a demand has been raised by an influential, albeit small, group of political leaders. Much of what is being said is a revamped version of the late Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's rhetoric, with the exception that the Awami League leadership was at least more coherent about its economics.

It is being argued that the repeated intervention of the military in politics has destroyed the fed-

eral framework. The 1973 Constitution has proved inadequate to prevent the usurpation of the provincial domain by the Centre and its own cancellation by the armed forces. The smaller provinces are, therefore, justified in rejecting a system which has failed to protect their interests and autonomy. Only a confederal constitution, it is said, can determine the adequate quantum of provincial autonomy and then protect it from the deprivations of the army and its allies.

Precedents

History is also summoned in aid of this proposition. The fears, of domination by the majority community, expressed by the All-India Muslim League in 1939, the Lahore Resolution of 1940 and the Delhi Resolution of 1946 are all cited as precedents supporting the confederal case. The establishment of a Council of Common Interests and Senate on the principle of provincial parity under the 1973 Constitution are also quoted as examples of a move towards a confederal system of Government.

As one reads the "Outline" published by the SBPF it becomes apparent that its authors have spent very little time in separating cause from effect. The undermining of the federal structure, for example, is the effect not the cause of myopic policies pursued by the

men at the top with scant regard for popular feeling in the smaller provinces. An adherence to federalism would have required them to follow a course of action which, while promoting the national objectives, did not threaten provincial autonomy. The federal principle is something which has always found prominent place in our constitutional theory but never in practice; its rejection, therefore, cannot conceivably bring about a change in the policies of our government.

The federal system of government is specifically designed for racially or culturally diverse groups of people who want to be united under a Central Government for some purposes and retain regional governments for others. Because this act of coming together is almost in the nature of a treaty, a vertical division of powers takes place between the Central and provincial Governments. To prevent authority from being abused, the rules governing this division are incorporated in a legal document and power is further distributed horizontally between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.

This diffusion of power between the different governments and the various institutions of government is one of the best safeguards devised so far against the exploitation of smaller units by the larger members of the federation. A bicameral legislature with one House established on the basis of provincial parity is yet another federalist method of ensuring that no single unit, irrespective of its size or population, can dominate the law-making process. The creation of the Senate and the Council of Common Interests under the 1973 Constitution was an acknowledgment of this rule and not a link in the chain of confederal evolution.

Safety devices

Similar safety devices are also built into the constitution-amending mechanism. Because a federal polity is created through the consent of its constituting units it is deemed advisable to make the Basic Law amendable through some sort of a joint central-provincial action. In the United States a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress must receive the assent of three-fourths of the states to become a constitutional amendment.

In Australia and Switzerland the amendment Bill after passing through both houses of the Federal legislature must receive the approval, in a referendum, of the majority of electors voting in a majority of the constituent units. In India a Bill which seeks to alter the balance of power between the Centre and the states (provinces) has to be ratified by the legislators of at least 50 per cent of the states before it can be presented to the President for assent.

The amending procedure of our Constitution is within the exclusive control of Parliament and needs to be improved. To bring it in to harmony with the requirements of federalism Parliament ought to share this power with the provinces. As a referendum on the Swiss or Australian pattern is a very cumbersome and expensive exercise, the Basic Law can be altered to provide that an amendment to the Constitution can be made only through a Bill which is approved by the two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament and by simple majorities of at least three of the four provincial assemblies.

Such a change will make it difficult for the Federal Government to guillotine argument and hurriedly write its whims and fancies into the Constitution. The period of debate will be increased and so will be the levels on which it is carried out, thus providing a greater opportunity to evaluate the merits of any alteration proposed. The people of different regions acting through their representatives in the regional legislatures will be provided a forum to express their doubts, fears or enthusiasm and thus participate in the process of constitutional change.

Procedural change, however, is not all that is required to entrench the federal doctrine in our Fundamental Law. The very wide executive powers which vest the control of many important provincial matters, including appointment of key functionaries, in the President need to be curtailed as do the powers of Parliament. The excessively long concurrent list makes it impossible to demarcate the boundaries which separate the powers of Parliament from those of the provincial Assemblies. This provides an easy opportunity for the Government at the Centre to exceed the limits of federal authority and intrude into

the provincial domain. Checks should be imposed on this threat to provincial autonomy by trimming the concurrent list and enlarging the scope of exercise of law-making powers by the provincial legislatures. These and other such measures within the federal framework will involve the people even of smaller regions in political and constitutional decision-making and widen the popular base of the Federal Government.

In our case, the absence or abeyance of the political process, rule by fiat rather than consensus and the tendency of the rulers to tighten their grip on power rather than promoting national unity and integration on a genuine basis has created a climate of mutual fear and distrust among federating units, on the one hand, and between the Centre and the provinces, on the other. But the chasms are not unbridgeable. Federalism unites people by recognising their ethnocultural plurality. Popular participation provides an opportunity to enter into relations with one another and go through common endeavours and experiences. Over a period of time, slowly and painstakingly, these rela-

tions and experiences mature into a shared system of meanings.

Primary importance

It is this gradually developed community of understanding and interests and not geographical boundaries, religious affinities or oaths of loyalty to the Constitution that gives democracy its inner vitality and resilience and arms it with great shock-absorbing power. Our constitutional theory has always acknowledged the primary importance of these principles for our polity. If we are to build towards a stable democratic order we must now commit ourselves to their practice in our politics.

It cannot be denied that the provinces need protection. But the SBPF confederal solution does not answer this need. Confederation would really mean a voluntary association of provinces, with the Centre deprived of any direct or effective power or authority over the citizens or the regions. Such a weak grouping is ill suited for resisting external aggression or the internal challenges of powerful interest groups.

[23 Mar 86 p 9]

[Text]

WE LIVE in a highly unbalanced society. The problems of widespread poverty, illiteracy and deprivation are made only more conspicuous and biting by wide disparities in development and income distribution between one region and another and within each region itself. Yet any move towards a more equalitarian setup is made impossible by the powerful feudal opposition to such a development. Without some sort of central authority and unified action it will not be possible to break these shackles and progress towards the concept and reality of a welfare State.

Food, clothing and shelter are not available to a large section of the population. A lot of efforts have

to be made for the promotion of education, provision of health facilities and creation of better working conditions. A uniform policy pursued by a central authority for the development of the nation as a whole is likely to prove more effective and achieve better results than the disjointed efforts of the provinces. To carry out these policies the Centre needs both power and purse. Federalism strikes a balance between a unitary system and a confederal solution. It leaves to the Centre enough resources for pursuing these policies but prevents it from trespassing on the regional territory by throwing a constitutional hedge around it.

Farm property

The provinces can join in this effort to uplift the masses. Reduction in the Federal area of operations and expenditure will leave more power and money with the units. The units, in their turn, must also reorganise their finances by undertaking a drastic downward revision

of their non-development expenditure. Further, to generate more income a beginning can be made by taxing agricultural property — higher agricultural incomes to be exact. Property tax has always been a provincial subject and, while the provinces have always clamoured for more money, so strong has been the feudal grip on the power structure that not even a thought has been given to raising revenue from this obvious and potentially rich source. Such a policy of taxation will not only strike at the root of feudal power but will also make considerable funds available for pursuing policies directed towards the promotion of public welfare and the economic well-being of the common man.

On the historical plane, too, the idea of a confederation is untenable. In the very few instances where such associations of provinces were made, they soon developed into federal States as the realisation dawned on the constituents that the vigour of government within the limits of law is one of the best guarantees of individual liberty. From 1778 to 1787 the U.S.A. was a confederation but the dangers embedded in such a loose grouping soon became apparent and a federation was formed. The Federalist Papers written by Hamilton, Madison and Jay to promote Union and the federalist ideal as enunciated by some of the renowned political scientists and as practised in many large and small countries eloquently expose the weaknesses and dangers inherent in a confederation. Like the United States, Germany and the Netherlands have also experimented with and rejected the confederal solution as wholly unworkable. Switzerland is the only surviving confederation but that, too, only in theory; for all practical purposes it has evolved into a federation.

As for the history which SBPF relies upon to prop up its confederal thesis, I do not propose to enter here into semantic wrangling over the meaning and effect of the Lahore and Delhi Resolutions. It is, however, necessary to state that in order to derive the legitimacy of a present-day claim from the words of some historical document it is imperative to read them in accord with the intentions of its drafters. The present can, therefore, be linked with the past through history only if there is a broadly agreed interpretation of the intents in question.

This is particularly so because, while some concepts may remain constant in meaning across the time span, the perception and relevance of these may change with the passage of time and under dictates of events. History is not a smoothly flowing stream. Its twists and turns and, more so, its discontinuities often render it impossible to make an accurate determination of past intentions. The only valid criteria we are then left with for interpreting such intentions is popular agreement. The basic flaw with the SBPF historiography is that it assumes a consensus where none exists.

Ironically, the proponents of federalism and the supporters of centrist control, too, rely on the same documents and history to prove their point. In such circumstances the words of the Resolutions can hardly prove to be a useful guide for the resolution of current problems.

The historical forces which are mobilised to create a world are very different from those that are required to maintain it. The arguments advanced to secure independence are different from those that are offered for its preservation.

We ought to remember that in order to preserve the world he was creating the Quaid-i-Azam had absolutely insisted on bringing the politics of Muslim majority provinces under the tight control of a nation-wide party. He never qualified his aim to be the sole spokesman of the Muslim cause. This consistent federal theme in our pre- and post-independence politics cannot be stressed too much.

Lahore Resolution

Further, the assertion that the confederal idea is sanctified by the Lahore Resolution was refuted by Quaid-i-Azam in his life-time. On Sept 15, 1944 Mr M.K. Gandhi addressed a letter to him raising certain queries about the Resolution. In reply to one of these questions in his letter of Sept 17, 1944, the Quaid-i-Azam made it clear that the provinces would not be transformed into independent States but will form "the units of Pakistan". In an interview published in the *Times of India* on Nov 9, 1945, he asserted that the units will be "federated units" of the "national Government" having all the autonomy that is to be found

"in the Constitutions of the United States of America, Canada and Australia". We cannot divorce the words of the Lahore Resolution from the intentions of its framers when interpreting these for our purposes. These clarifications by the Quaid-i-Azam leave one in no doubt that the Lahore Resolution was a demand for the creation of a strong and united federal State of Pakistan and not a call for setting up a number of weak confederacies.

The 1973 Constitution enshrines our commitment to a federal democracy. Its suspension by the military regime and the intervention of the armed forces in our politics is not an indictment of the Constitution but symptomatic of our indifference to the imperatives of democratic federalism. The army emerges on the political scene when the civilian government is under stress and societal conditions are favourable. No constitution, whether federal or confederal, can of its own guarantee political stability. It is merely a document and is only as strong as our commitment to it. This commitment is strengthened when the rulers conduct their business in accordance with the terms of the constitution and conform to rules. Participatory processes and respect for the rule of law foster a democratic tradition which in times of trouble proves to be the best insurance against praetorianism.

Separate confederacies exercising the same kind of powers, often in conflict with one another, can hardly provide fertile soil for the growth of stable political institutions on a national level. The weakness of authority at the Centre and proliferation of conflicts between the units is all what a powerful group needs as an excuse to engineer a coup under the pretext of restoring order. Fragmentation of authority quite often opens the door for a strong man to walk in and

impose his will on the disparate segments of society.

Inherent weakness

A confederal system will increase the very dangers it is supposed to forestall. But in spite of this doctrinal inconsistency and inherent weaknesses the idea has gained some ground. Credit or blame for this must be apportioned equally between the SBPF and the Government. The top heavy centrist policies of the last many years have ignored the interest of the people of smaller provinces. An atmosphere has been created where any idea, no matter how subversive, which has an air of novelty and an appearance of opposition to central authority finds immediate support in certain quarters. The demand for a confederation consequently strikes a responsive note.

It has also granted avidly desired publicity to the SBPF leadership and made them a focus of media attention. Some of these leaders enjoy a certain appeal and with their help the move can ignite fissiparous tendencies in our body politic. The answer to it lies in working towards a balanced and fully representative system of government and not in repression. As the East Pakistan tragedy illustrates repression breeds hate and hate is the worst enemy of rational analysis and political stability. A free government must give its people the freedom to debate, discuss, espouse or advocate ideas no matter how subversive it considers them to be. If freedom of expression has any meaning it is the freedom to express an idea which may be obnoxious to the majority of the people. The path of safety lies in providing an opportunity freely to discuss the supposed grievances and proposed remedies in the firm belief that a false idea when exposed to public scrutiny will defeat itself.

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PAKISTAN

ANTI-PAKISTAN SLOGANS ASSAILED

Karachi DAWN in English 17 Mar 86 p 3

[Text]

KARACHI, March 16: Prof. Ghafur Ahmad, Naib Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan), in a Press statement said on Sunday that anti-Pakistan slogans on the arrival of Bacha Khan in Karachi were the result of wrong policies of the government to woo anti-Pakistan elements.

He said there was gross inconsistency in government policies which had offered a special plane to take Bacha Khan to India, despite the known anti-Pakistan stance of the Khudai Khidmatgar leader.

HOTI: Mr Bostan Ali Hoti, President of Karachi Zonal Muslim League, in a Press statement wondered how persons who raised such slogans and others who failed to check the slogan-mongers could be held patriotic.

He asked the government to take notice of these people and initiate due process of law so that others are dis-couraged in future.

Such slogans also provoke the patriotic elements and could result in violence if the government did not take action, he warned.

He also urged the MRD to take due notice of such utterances and irresponsible acts on the part of leaders of its component parties and their supporters, or the people would be fully justified to accept it as a policy of the MRD itself.

APP adds:

NADEEM: In separate statements Sind Ministers, Al-Haj Shamimuddin and Mr Zuhair Akram Nadeem, censured elements who had gone to receive Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and raised slogans against Islam, Pakistan and the Quaid-i-Azam.

They appealed to patriotic elements to take notice of such elements and hold them accountable for their mischievous acts.

They pointed out that they were the same elements who had opposed the Freedom Movement and creation of Pakistan. But it was the blessing of Almighty Allah and the struggle of Muslims of the Sub-continent who at last got a separate homeland and the opponents had to meet disgrace.

MPAs: Similar statements issued by members of the provincial Assembly, Mr Abdul Sattar Viyani and Mr Nasiruddin said that not only the people of Karachi but of the entire country fully knew about the nefarious thinking and designs of such people who raised slogans against Islam and Pakistan.

They said that it was no more a hidden secret that such elements were out to create chaos and confusion in the country on the behest of a particular group and had nefarious designs against the very existence of the country.

They warned that the people of Karachi would never tolerate such elements and strictly hold them accountable for their unwanted acts.

ML LEADERS: Muslim League leaders, Sarfraz Khan, Kamal Ahmed Siddiqi and Dr Habibur Rehman also condemned those who at the time of welcoming Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan raised slogans like "break up Pakistan". They also raised slogans against the Quaid-i-Azam.

They said that such people never reconciled with the creation of Pakistan and noted that with democratic freedom they were taking undue advantage to create chaos and dissension in the country.

Maulana Shah Turabul Huq, MNA, said that the supporters of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, by raising slogans for breaking up Pakistan, proved that neither they had any interest in democracy nor in solving the problems of people.

In fact they were engaged in machinations against the very existence of Pakistan.

People were losing patience and would not tolerate anti-Pakistan elements, he warned.

AFGHANI: Maulana Ghulam Dastgir Afghani, religious leader and former President of Jamaat Ahle Sunnat, described the journey of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan from Peshawar to Karachi as "Dajjali Safar".

Those who raised slogans against Pakistan could only be described as agents of enemies of Pakistan, he asserted.

Maulana Irshadul Huq Thanvi also condemned slogans against Pakistan and ideology of Pakistan. In fact such elements gave a demonstration of their evelish thinking and mental bankruptcy.

He called upon the people to make it clear to clique of "Sarhad Gandhi" that there is no room for traitors in Pakistan.

Other statements were also issued by Maulana Mohammad Wasaya Al-Khateeb, President Jamaat Ahle Sunnat, Karachi; Hafiz Sher Khan Niazi, Acting Nazim-i-Aala, Alhaj Malik Ahmad Khan, Haji Khan Mohammad Paracha, Qari Gul Jahan Siddiqi and Haji Abdullah Khan.—APP.

Sind Solidarity Forum has taken exception to slogans raised against Pakistan on the occasion of arrival of the Khudai Khidmatgar leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, here on Saturday.

In a Press release it urged all patriotic elements to condemn those who want to see Pakistan dismembered.

Shaikh Liaquat Husain, a PML leader, said in a Pres statement Mr. Ghaffar Khan's designs were too well known to cause any surprise over his latest utterances against Pakistan. He urged the Government to take cognisance of the activities of such persons who publicly criticised Pakistan's ideology.

AIJAZ TALPUR: Our Staff Correspondent from Hyderabad adds:

Pakistan is an ideological state and it was created only in the name of Islam and no Muslims, particularly the people of Sind province, will tolerate anti-Islamic and anti-state activities.

This was observed by Acting Sind

Chief Minister, Mir Ajaz Ali Khan Talpur, in a statement while taking exception of the remarks by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan on his arrival in Karachi on Saturday.

He was of the view that the people of Sind, who had given vote for 'separate homeland for Muslims, would never like to be a party in the dismemberment of the country.

Mr. Talpur also advised those whom he called disgruntled elements to shun the politics of disruption, division among various sections of population, particularly those living in the gate of Islam — that is Sind province.

Commenting on 'Ghaffar-Syed Bhai Bhai' slogans, Mir Ajaz Ali Khan Talpur said that all the political forces following restoration of democracy were free to express their point of view within law, but such slogans which may create feeling of disaffection and misgivings will not be allowed at all.

About recently emerged Sind-Baluch-Pakhtoon-Front (SBPF), the Acting Chief Minister said that those who were in power and government and did not serve the people of the country were again attempting to befool the innocent people by propagating nationalities just for their political ends.

PPI from Sukkur adds: Political leaders, social workers, journalists and people from all walks of life have condemned the anti-Pakistan slogans raised in Karachi on Saturday on arrival of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

In separate Press statements, they said the politics of Khan Ghaffar Khan was gliding due to existence of Pakistan. If there will be no Pakistan, his politics would die its natural death.

They said every citizen of Pakistan was prepared to safeguard its entity even at the cost of his life.

The leaders include: Khan Munawwar Khan, MPA, Begum Naureen Islamuddin and other.

Meanwhile, a meeting of journalists held under the presidentship of Mr Sami Pirzada, General-Secretary, Sind Journalists Forum, decided to boycott the political activities of Ghaffar Khan.

PAKISTAN

MINISTER CITES STATISTICS ON LAND SAVED FROM WATERLOGGING

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 21 Mar 86 p 1

[Text]

LAHORE, March 20: Federal Minister for Water and Power Jamal Said Mian said that so far the government has completed 30 projects with an investment of Rs. 10 billion and protected 8.5 million acres of land from waterlogging and salinity.

Addressing the waterlogging and salinity seminar here today, the minister said 14 projects were under implementation. These would cover an area of another seven million acres at a cost of Rs. 10 million.

His ministry, Jamal Said Mian added, is in the process of working out a revised investment schedule and implementation strategy to combat this menace in the wake of Prime Minister's declaration allocating Rs. 15 billion for the purpose. It will, he said, evolve a new strategy after due evaluation of its past efforts. The plan is to eliminate waterlogging in areas with water-

table within five feet from the surface round the year.

The ministry also proposes to involve private sector in the sweet water zones and provide it with financial and technical assistance in sinking tubewells to control water-table and supplement irrigation. It is also trying to develop a strategy to reduce government's liability through transition of Scarp projects.

Earlier Wapda chairman Ghulam Safdar Butt said in his address of welcome problem of waterlogging and salinity has not been entirely solved. "We are, however, in a position to say that we have got on top of it." Only 4.5 million acres or 11 per cent of the total irrigated area remains seriously waterlogged and results of the most recent surveys indicate that the extent of soil salinity has gone down from about 40 per cent to 28 per cent.

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END